Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ... Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
6. Objections to Libertarian Free will 70 Paul L. Manata © 2011 Reformed Christians can appeal to several kinds of arguments in objecting to libertarian freedom. Reformed Christians do not need to accept the cogency of each of these arguments, and Reformed theology does not demand that all of them be good arguments, but they do show that rejection of libertarianism rests on more than just some preferred theological system. There are serious theological and philosophical objections to libertarianism. There are also serious empirical objections. I do not mean the following to function as an exhaustive look at these objections to libertarian free will, but only to serve as a very minor introduction to them. 6.1 Theological arguments Reformed Christians can appeal to their confessional interpretation of certain biblical doctrines that, if correct, rule out libertarian free will. There are also several proof texts that make libertarianism hard to square with. However, these verses may only rule out libertarianism with respect to salvation and not everyday mundane choosings. Other passages would seem to speak to everyday mundane choosings (e.g., an inductive argument from various mundane events and actions said to be decreed or caused by God; also Ephesians 1:11; on this, see Feinberg’s exegesis in No One Like Him). We would also want to know how God could bring about an inspired and inerrant Bible if all the writers wrote with libertarian free will. Moreover, Reformed thinkers may claim that the libertarian’s notions of ‘love’ and ‘moral responsibility’ are not the Bible’s, and so while they claim that their view is motivated by the Bible’s, it’s really an imposition of more modern, Western, sentimental notions of those things.
6.2 Empirical arguments 71 Paul L. Manata © 2011 Libertarianism is held hostage to the findings of science. While it may be that quantum indeterminism has made more unlikely the idea of determinism by the laws of physics, this indeterminism only functions at the quantum level and not the macro level (at least as far as we can tell). 97 So you could have nomological determinism at the macro level. However, there are other things that might determine, and science does seem to be moving in a more deterministic direction in these areas. These areas would be the fields of biology, sociology, psychology, economics, the environment, and often a conjunction of all five. It is very hard for some to see how we do not have our wills and characters already set and formed by our upbringing, which includes all the above various factors coming into play. These character-‐forming events take place very early in our lives, far earlier than our consciously choosing to set our wills and form our own character in a way that is truly ultimately “up to us.” Nevertheless, these kinds of arguments are subject to the ever-‐changing winds of research, and no knockdown argument should be sought from them. 6.3 Frankfurt-‐style counter examples I presented a ‘Frankfurt-‐style counter example’ above. These can be used to show that ability to do otherwise is not required for moral responsibility. As I indicated, there is a lot of literature devoted to this topic, but here is one response to Frankfurt counter examples. It is claimed that the counter examples beg the question because on indeterminism, no controller could know in advance what a libertarian free person was going to do. It is “unsettled” up to the 97 However, Dr. John Byl via email correspondence (7/24/11) points out that some argue quantum indeterminism at the micro level could affect things at the macro level, see, John C. Beckman, “Quantum Mechanics, Chaos Physics and the Open View of God,” Philosophia Christi 4 #1: 2002, 203-‐213.
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6.2 Empirical arguments<br />
71<br />
Paul L. Manata © 2011<br />
Libertarianism is held hostage to the findings of science. While it may be that<br />
quantum indeterminism has made more unlikely the idea of determinism by the<br />
laws of physics, this indeterminism only functions at the quantum level <strong>and</strong> not<br />
the macro level (at least as far as we can tell). 97 So you could have nomological<br />
determinism at the macro level. However, there are other things that might<br />
determine, <strong>and</strong> science does seem to be moving in a more deterministic direction<br />
in these areas. These areas would be the fields of biology, sociology, psychology,<br />
economics, the environment, <strong>and</strong> often a conjunction of all five. It is very hard for<br />
some to see how we do not have our wills <strong>and</strong> characters already set <strong>and</strong> formed<br />
by our upbringing, which includes all the above various factors coming into play.<br />
These character-‐forming events take place very early in our lives, far earlier than<br />
our consciously choosing to set our wills <strong>and</strong> form our own character in a way<br />
that is truly ultimately “up to us.” Nevertheless, these kinds of arguments are<br />
subject to the ever-‐changing winds of research, <strong>and</strong> no knockdown argument<br />
should be sought from them.<br />
6.3 Frankfurt-‐style counter examples<br />
I presented a ‘Frankfurt-‐style counter example’ above. These can be used to<br />
show that ability to do otherwise is not required for moral responsibility. As I<br />
indicated, there is a lot of literature devoted to this topic, but here is one<br />
response to Frankfurt counter examples. It is claimed that the counter examples<br />
beg the question because on indeterminism, no controller could know in advance<br />
what a libertarian free person was going to do. It is “unsettled” up to the<br />
97 However, Dr. John Byl via email correspondence (7/24/11) points out that some<br />
argue quantum indeterminism at the micro level could affect things at the macro<br />
level, see, John C. Beckman, “Quantum Mechanics, Chaos Physics <strong>and</strong> the Open View<br />
of God,” Philosophia Christi 4 #1: 2002, 203-‐213.
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