Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...

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Paul L. Manata © 2011
God might have decreed otherwise.” 96 If the contingency desired is physical
contingency, then that fits with certain types of determinism too. If it is desired
that our actions not be absolutely necessary, that fits with determinism too.
Determinism can allow for a sense of “ability to do otherwise” too. So if that is
what is desired, and one wants to buy into classical compatibilism, this fits with
determinism too. What does synchronic contingency give the Reformed view,
then? I suggest: nothing, at least if the Reformed view wishes to maintain RT as
its distinctives.
I understand that the above theologians desire to distance themselves and the
Reformed tradition from Edwards. That’s fine; my purpose here is not to argue
for any specific model of determinism or compatibilism, or for Edwards. But here
is the point that’s been made throughout the paper: Reformed theology is
deterministic and since it maintains man is morally responsible for his actions it
will require one type of compatibilism or other. But, the Reformed perimeters are
expansive enough to allow freedom in working out what model one thinks best
explains or describes this kind of determinism and compatibilism. So while one
may reject Edwards, one may not reject determinism and compatibilism
simpliciter. Just because Edwards’s model doesn’t work (assume for the sake of
argument), this doesn’t mean the project of compatibilism doesn’t work. Edwards
was a compatibilist. Compatibilism isn’t Edwards. Lastly, I understand the desire
to get God “off the hook” for evil (which is another motivation for this Reformed
non-­‐determinism, I suspect). But since the Reformers who hold this Scotist view
also hold to something like hard determinism in matters of salvation, and that is
arguably what is most offensive about Reformed theology to those outside the
tradition, then God is still on the hook.
96 Paul Helm, “An Augustinian-­‐Calvinist Response,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four
Views (IVP Academic, 2001), p. 157.