Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...

67
Paul L. Manata © 2011
Apparently, Scotus’ analysis of omniscience rescues contingency, but it
does so at the expense of the freedom of free agents—particularly human
beings. 94
But Langston claims that Scotus is really a compatibilist, and so these
consequences wouldn’t be troubling to him. Thus, Langston says that the appeal
to Scotus doesn’t get the middle way between compatibilism and
incompatibilism that Drs. Beck, Muller, and Vos seem to want. If they dig in their
heels and insist that Scotus gives us live possibilities and all the other libertarian
trappings that seem inherent in his view, then their view is just inconsistent with
Reformed views of God’s decree, providence, and foreknowledge.
However, it appears an answer may not be forthcoming. While, on the libertarian
reading of Scotus, he surely proclaimed that God’s foreknowledge was
compatible with incompatibilistic human freedom, he didn’t offer an analysis of
how. Before proceeding let me make a terminological adjustment. The
foreknowledge debate brings about some ironic shifts in the terminology used in
this paper so far. Those who think that foreknowledge is not a threat to
libertarian free will are called compatibilists, while those who think such
knowledge is a threat to libertarian freedom are called incompatibilist. The
Reformed have traditionally been in the latter camp yet also compatibilists about
free will and moral responsibility with determinism.
Regarding a Scotist answer to the foreknowledge argument, James Frank
remarks, “Scotus does not attempt any such explanations. He seems content to
leave in silence what must have appeared to him the mystery of God’s inner life.”
For Scotus “it seems to have sufficed to have established the mere fact” of the
94 Douglas Langston, God’s willing knowledge: The influence of Scotus’ Analysis of
Omniscience (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), p. 24.