Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...

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Paul L. Manata © 2011
causality. For example, in his recently published systematic theology by Michael
Horton, he brings up the Reformed tradition of secondary causality. Initially,
Horton seems to suggest that the Reformers were only objecting to certain kinds
of determinism. For example, he says, the Reformed view “help[s] us to avoid the
dangers of both hypersupernaturalistic fatalism and naturalism.” 69 It should be
clear that on the definitions I have given above, determinism does not demand
fatalism or naturalistic determinism. What I do is conditionally necessary on
God’s decree, contingent on his decree. It is not naturalistically determined, and
it does not occur no matter what.
Horton then goes on to make the point that secondary causation is real, and that
divine and human agency “works simultaneously” in specific actions and events.
This means, “one is the secondary or instrumental cause and the other is the
primary or ultimate cause.” 70 But of course, determinism and compatibilism can
allow for all of this. 71 (In fact, it sounds deterministic!) Determinism (and
compatibilism) is not the thesis that only one cause operates in the world. That is
monocausality. Determinism, as Robert Kane points out, “does not imply that we
have no influence on how things turn out, including the molding of our
characters. We obviously do have such an influence, and determinism alone does
69 Michael Horton, The Christian Faith: Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way
(Zondervan, 2011), p. 356. ‘Hypersupernaturalistic fatalism’ apparently refers to
‘occasionalism,’ p. 359. On occasionalism, see the SEP entry,
.
70 Ibid.
71 It is interesting to note here that the “works together” terminology is classic
‘synchronic contingency’ terminology, but then Horton applies to the human worker
the role of “instrument,” which is how the determinist readings of Scotus are taken.
See James Frank, “Duns Scotus on Autonomous Freedom and Divine Co-­‐Causality,”
in Medieval Philosophy and Theology. Vol 2. Ed. By Norman Kretzmann, et al.
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 160.