Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...

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Paul L. Manata © 2011
epistemic contingency. Perhaps Horton could define ‘fortuitous’ in terms of
epistemic probability theory. On this analysis, that something is ‘chance’ is
indexed to human knowers in terms of epistemic equiprobability. Since a human
knower does not know for certain whether heads or tails will come up when a
fair coin is tossed, the event is equiprobable relative to this knower. So, Horton
could mean, “It is not just that they seem fortuitous; rather, they are
[epistemically] fortuitous—but to us rather than to God.” And since it is quite
compatible for an event to be epistemically probable to one knower and not
another, the contradiction vanishes. Thus, there is an interpretation that can be
given to how older Reformed theologians spoke that makes their claims about
chance or fortune compatible with a determinist metaphysic.
I am not sure how to interpret Horton. That a determined action is epistemically
fortuitous to some agent is completely compatible with determinism, 67 and if this
is the only contingency desired for the Reformed view, why claim contingency is
incompatible with determinism? It is clear to me, though, that non-­‐determinist
readers of Scotus go further than mere epistemic “chanciness.” They hold to
ontological “chanciness.” 68 That is, our actions are not merely epistemically
fortuitous but, as Horton says, “they are fortuitous.” On this score, these
theologians move things past the epistemic limitations mentioned above and into
ontological categories such as secondary causality. But does the contingency of
secondary causes imply that determinism is false?
E.3.1.2 Secondary causality
Another conception of contingency is spoken about in terms of secondary
67 Also see Tomis Kapitan, “Doxastic Freedom: A Compatibilist Alternative,”
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1989), pp. 31-­‐41.
68 I don’t mean anything pejorative by “chanciness;” it is a euphemism for the open
and unsettled nature of indeterminist actions.