Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...

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Paul L. Manata © 2011
and God’s universal decree. Reformed theology is neither determinist nor
indeterminist. However, this via media seems to me to be the minority
interpretation as most scholars settle on indeterminism, with the majority of the
rest settling on determinism. Further interpretive problems arise when we
consider that some scholars have claimed that synchronic contingency applies
only to God’s freedom but man’s freedom is analyzed in terms of diachronic
contingency (i.e., S wills X at t1 but S can not-­‐will X at t2). The latter here too
seems to be the minority view; Scotus seemed to apply synchronic and diachronic
contingency to man’s will, but the former only to God’s will. Perhaps the cause
for much of these confusions is that, “For Scotus, the freedom of the human will
is not the central issue . . . We are left to infer his views from discussions focusing
mainly on the divine will—where the human or angelic will is brought in as foil, if
it is mentioned at all.” 60 Nevertheless, we can set aside the debate about
whether Scotus was a compatibilist or not, for if it is admitted that he was then I
have nothing to argue against in this section. So, we will proceed upon the
assumption that Scotus’ view affirms that incompatibilism is true and that man is
free and morally responsible, the sine qua non of libertarianism. 61
204–220; Anthony Kenny, Medieval Philosophy: A New History of Western Philosophy,
Vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 308–309; and Marilyn McCord Adams
and Norman Kretzman’s introduction to William Ockham: Predestination, God’s
Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents (Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1969), pp. 1–33.
Yet, Adams notes the indeterministic tendencies in Scotus and so thinks it probable
that Scotus is simply inconsistent, p. 50.
60 Michael Sylwanowicz, Contingent Causality and the Foundation of Duns Scotus’
Metaphysic (Brill Academic, 1996), p. 193. Also, Sylwanowicz’s argument that Scotus
was a compatibilist is very strong.
61 Furthermore, either synchronic contingency is compatible with compatibilism or
it is not. If it is, then I don’t have major objections to this since my paper allows for
the freedom to develop divergent models. Synchronic contingency is also either
compatible with libertarianism or it is not. If it is not, then why isn’t it? What about
libertarianism rules out the compatibility? I can’t see anything that does. Therefore,