Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...

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50 Paul L. Manata © 2011 some of the problems it faces. This view is becoming increasingly popular, held to by Reformed theologians Andreas Beck, Richard Muller, Willem van Asselt, and Antonie Vos, among others. A recent book which defends the above notion was published in the “Texts and Studies in Reformation and Post-‐Reformation Thought” series, 56 which was positively blurbed by Westminster Seminary professor Carl Trueman. More recently, the esteemed Richard Muller gave a lecture at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School where he put forth this view, and his lecture was linked to without any commentary either way by Westminster California professor R. Scott Clark’s weblog. Another Reformed theologian, Kim Riddlebarger, linked to the Muller lecture at his weblog—again, without any critical comment—and called it “very helpful.” Interestingly, one can also see this view championed on the Internet by those who identify with the Barthian wing of Reformed theology. So the view seems to be picking up steam. Since this position conflicts with my claim that Reformed theology is deterministic and that the freedom we have is best classified as a type of compatibilist freedom, what follows will be more critical than descriptive. This will also be the most difficult part of the paper, but maybe the most profitable for those who work through it. I also press the point that what follows is introductory, and so is not meant to be a sustained, rigorous, and comprehensive critique. Having duly protected myself with the “it wasn’t meant to be a rigorous critique” out, I will now set forth one of the main ideas of this view. E.2 Synchronic contingency The idea is that Reformed scholasticism owes much to Duns Scotus’ alleged middle way between determinism and indeterminism, the idea of ‘synchronic 56 Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology, ed. Willem J. van Asselt et al. (Baker Academic, 2010).
51 Paul L. Manata © 2011 contingency.’ The basic idea of synchronic contingency can be expressed thus: “An actual state of affairs is associated with synchronic contingency when it could be non-‐actual at the very moment of time at which it is actual.” 57 More precisely, X is synchronically contingent at some time t if and only if X occurs at t and it is possible that X does not occur at t. In reference to an act of the will being synchronically contingent, we would have: someone S wills X at t and it is possible that S does not will X at t. Scotus and his interpreters have claimed that X is willed contingently at time t if and only if it is both logically and really possible to will not-‐X at t. Many scholars have pointed out that Scotus is giving us classic libertarianism, especially when conjoined with his views on self-‐determination. 58 How someone’s particular action at a time becomes actualized is, ultimately, because God wills it. 59 Thus, it is argued that Reformed theology preserved contingency 57“The Philosophy of Duns Scotus” by Simo Knuuttila, reviewed by A. Vos in Ars Disputandi, v.7 2007. 58 See e.g., Thomas Williams, “John Duns Scotus,” entry for Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), last accessed 7/16/11, and The Divine Nature and Scotus’ Libertarianism: A Reply to Mary Beth Ingham, available online
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