Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...

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Paul L. Manata © 2011
idiosyncratic definition of libertarianism as the view that we have some kind of
absolute freedom and that we are utterly divorced from God’s sovereignty. On
this understanding of libertarianism their view may not be ‘libertarian,’ but that is
an uninteresting point since not even libertarians are this kind of libertarian! At
least, they need not be. As libertarian Kenneth Keathley puts it, “human freedom
is both derived and genuinely ours. Scripture does not present human freedom as
something absolute, unlimited, or autonomous.” 55 Another reason for the
sketchiness is that to be consistent with Reformed orthodoxy, RT is cashed out in
a way that sounds deterministic (i.e., the broad definition given above), but then
determinism is explicitly denied. On the other hand, when the alleged non-­‐
libertarian view of the will is cashed out, it sounds like classic libertarianism.
One reason I tried to avoid discussing this topic is because a study of it can hardly
be done apart from employing the archaic terms that pepper the pages of those
writing on this issue. Here’s a sampling of terms used: “synchronic contingency,”
“diachronic contingency,” “potentia Dei absoluta,” “potentia Dei ordinata,”
“necessitas consequentiis,” “necessitas consequentiae,” “scientia necessaria,”
“scientia voluntaria,” “liberum arbitrium indifferentiae,” ad nauseum—I mean,
those terms are used a lot! Moreover, this debate is involved in medieval
metaphysics, theological voluntarism, the relation between God and time,
specialized notions of determinism and contingency, modal logic, and a host of
exegetical questions as to what this or that scholastic Reformer meant and to
what extent he may or may not have, say, borrowed from thinkers such as Duns
Scotus or Thomas Aquinas.
Nevertheless, I should make some introductory remarks on this view and on
55 Kenneth Keathley, Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach (B&H Academic,
2010), p. 10.