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Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...

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41<br />

Paul L. Manata © 2011<br />

commits murder or is coerced to kill; in either case, he kills <strong>and</strong> cannot do<br />

otherwise than kill. Therefore, moral responsibility does not require the<br />

ability to do otherwise. 47<br />

But if moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise, what does<br />

it require? Semi-­‐compatibilists say that moral responsibility requires control.<br />

Someone who acts in a morally responsible way must be in control of his or her<br />

action. They then make a further distinction between two kinds of control:<br />

regulative control <strong>and</strong> guidance control. The former requires the ability to do<br />

otherwise, the latter does not; <strong>and</strong> it is only the latter, they argue, that is<br />

required for responsibility. To give an example of the latter kind, suppose your<br />

steering wheel is locked <strong>and</strong> will eventually force your car to the right. You,<br />

however, have planned to turn right in order to go to the gas station. At the<br />

moment the wheel will turn your car right if you were to keep going straight or<br />

maybe turn left, you turn your car to the right <strong>and</strong> “guide” it into the gas station.<br />

This is to exhibit a certain kind of control over the car, guidance control. And this<br />

kind of control doesn’t require alternative possibilities, it requires being<br />

responsive to reasons. This means you guide your car (in our example) to the<br />

right for reasons or motives rather than, say, out of a compulsive habit to turn<br />

into gas stations <strong>and</strong> purchase Oreo cookies even if you had reasons to go to the<br />

left.<br />

But guidance control is not enough for responsibility. A compulsive Oreo cookie<br />

addict will also exhibit guidance control in grabbing the tray of double stuffed<br />

Oreos, <strong>and</strong> she will do so for reasons <strong>and</strong> motives. So what else do semi-­‐<br />

47 This is my own example, but it is similar to other ones. In another one the relevant<br />

action was “voting,” but oddly enough, some <strong>Reformed</strong> Christians who refer to<br />

themselves as “two kingdoms” have said that we are not morally responsible for our<br />

voting (!), thus I used an example for which there should be no debate.

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