Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...

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Paul L. Manata © 2011
actions are compatible with those actions being determined. But how are we to
understand this? How can we be free if we must do what we have been decreed
to do? How can we be free if we don’t have live, alternative possibilities open to
us, any of which we can bring about through an act of will? That is, how can we
be morally responsible if we cannot do other than we do? If we cannot refrain
from doing what we are decreed to do? How can we be free or responsible if we
are not the ultimate source of our actions? I would like to provide a bare bones
look at two particular compatibilist models Reformed Christians have been
attracted to over the years.
4.1 Classical Compatibilism
By far, the majority position in Reformed thought on free will has been what is
referred to as the classical compatibilist model. This view begins by asking what
we normally mean when we say that we did something freely. For instance, when
we say we are free to choose Lucky Charms for breakfast we ordinarily seem to
mean that we have some kind of power or ability such that if we were to want or
decide or desire to eat Lucky Charms for breakfast, then we could do so.
Furthermore, by saying we are free we ordinarily mean that we are not
constrained, forced, coerced or blocked from doing what we want to do. So,
classical compatibilism says that we are free when (1) we are able to do what we
want or desire to do, and (2) when there is an absence of constraints keeping us
from doing what we want to do, or forcing us to do what we don’t want to do.
You will recall that the ability to do otherwise seemed to be an important
requirement for freedom and responsibility (sec. 2.2), and that determinism
seemed to rule this ability out. Classical compatibilism claims that there is a sense
in which we can do otherwise than we do and that this sense is compatible with
determinism. So, can we do otherwise than eat Lucky Charms? Classical