Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ... Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
1. Introduction 1.1 Complaints and criticisms 1.2 Confusions and clarifications 1.2.1 Confusions 1.2.2 Clarification 2. Free Will and Moral Responsibility: An Introduction 2.1 An ordinary case 2.2 Forking paths and doing otherwise 2.3 The threat of determinism 2.4 RT and the threat of determinism 3. Where Reformed Theology Stands: A Primer 3.1 How we got here: A broad overview 3.2 Reformed theology as a kind of determinism 3.3 A kind of determinism? 3.4 A Reformed perimeter fence 3.5 Nature determinism vs. act determinism 4. Reformed Theology, Free Will and Moral Responsibility 4.1 Classical compatibilism 4.2 The Consequence Argument 4.3 Semi-‐compatibilism 5. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will and Moral Responsibility 5.1 Libertarian free will: the basics 2 Paul L. Manata © 2011
5.2 Frankfurt libertarians 5.3 Agent causation 3 Paul L. Manata © 2011 E. Excursus: Reformed Libertarianism (or something near enough) E.1 Introduction E.2 Synchronic contingency E.3 Objections E.3.1 Contingency E.3.1.1 Epistemic contingency E.3.1.2 Secondary causality E.3.1.3 Whose contingency? E.3.2 The foreknowledge argument E.4 The upshot 6. Objections to Libertarian Free Will 6.1 Theological objections 6.2 Empirical objections 6.3 Frankfurt counterexamples 6.4 The arbitrariness objection 6.5 The luck objection 6.6 The foreknowledge argument 6.7 Incompatibilist Mountain and the Libertarian Dilemma 7. Closing Remarks Further Reading
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5.2 Frankfurt libertarians<br />
5.3 Agent causation<br />
3<br />
Paul L. Manata © 2011<br />
E. Excursus: <strong>Reformed</strong> Libertarianism (or something near enough)<br />
E.1 Introduction<br />
E.2 Synchronic contingency<br />
E.3 Objections<br />
E.3.1 Contingency<br />
E.3.1.1 Epistemic contingency<br />
E.3.1.2 Secondary causality<br />
E.3.1.3 Whose contingency?<br />
E.3.2 The foreknowledge argument<br />
E.4 The upshot<br />
6. Objections to Libertarian <strong>Free</strong> <strong>Will</strong><br />
6.1 Theological objections<br />
6.2 Empirical objections<br />
6.3 Frankfurt counterexamples<br />
6.4 The arbitrariness objection<br />
6.5 The luck objection<br />
6.6 The foreknowledge argument<br />
6.7 Incompatibilist Mountain <strong>and</strong> the Libertarian Dilemma<br />
7. Closing Remarks<br />
Further Reading
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