Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ... Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
28 Paul L. Manata © 2011 determinism. 40 But given the confessional statements and their explications, conjoined with our definition of determinism, Reformed theology is deterministic. Call this ‘determinism simpliciter,’ if you like. Thus, while Taylor and Kane’s definitions are fairly broad, that is to their credit. Notice that these definitions do not commit a Reformed determinist to some specific model of determinism. The Reformed confessions seem to rule out at least some models of determinism. For example, chapter nine of the Westminster Confession reads: “God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor, by any absolute necessity of nature, determined to good, or evil.” Even regarding causal determinism, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events or conditions, our definition doesn’t commit one to a specific model of causal determinism. For instance, it need not commit the Reformed Christian to any sort of mechanistic, natural or physical causation, which would add in natural laws to the above definition of causal determinism. As John Feinberg points out, Though some think determinism in the physical world also applies to human action, it is dubious that it does. Moreover, it is critical to understand that Calvinistic determinists with respect to human actions do not mean by determinism the sort that operates in the natural world. Because Calvinist determinists are not postulating that physical determinism governs human actions, objections to Calvinist determinists that misconstrue it as physical determinism are simply misguided and in 40 The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Collier-‐MacMillan, 1967) Vol. 2 cites numerous forms of determinism: (i) ethical determinism, (ii) logical determinism, (iii) theological determinism, (iv), physical determinism, (v) psychological determinism, pp. 372–373; but there’s more, e.g., (vi) causal determinism, and (vii) teleological determinism, and each of these sub-‐sets of determinisms admits of sub-‐sets of models.
no way refute Calvinism. 41 29 Paul L. Manata © 2011 Moreover, divine-‐causation isn’t like models of ordinary causation, for it’s sui-‐ generis (i.e., one of a kind, in its own category, etc.). Lastly, this definition allows wide views in matters of empirical science. For example, if quantum indeterminism obtains, that would not falsify determinism in this broad sense, i.e., determinism per se or determinism simpliciter. 42 So I think this non-‐model-‐ specific definition is a wise one for Reformed theologians to endorse. Suppose we view all the possible models of determinism as members of the set of possible determining conditions, D. So, D = {D1, D2, D3, D4, . . . Dn}. I am claiming that those who deny Reformed theology is deterministic are denying that it is one or more members of the set D. However, I am claiming that Reformed theology affirms at least one member of the set D. So, that Reformed theology is not Stoic determinism, “philosophical determinism,” 43 Cartesian determinism, physicalist causal determinism, logical determinism, etc., does not imply that it is not a kind of determinism. For lack of a better term, I will call it “theological determinism.” 3.4 A Reformed perimeter fence Based on our very short look at where Reformed theology is situated in discussions of freedom and moral responsibility, I think we can walk away with some propositions out of which we can construct a perimeter fence that I think all Reformed Christians who agree with the Confessional statements I cited should at least agree with: 41 John Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God (Crossway, 2001), p. 632. 42 Quantum indetermined particles would not be absolutely indeterminate, they would be indeterminate with respect to laws of physics, not with respect to God’s decree. Thus, one would not be able to predict their future location given laws of physics, yet God (or anyone he tells) could still predict it for he determined it. 43 A term I have seen Richard Muller employ several times, though I’m not entirely clear what it means.
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no way refute Calvinism. 41<br />
29<br />
Paul L. Manata © 2011<br />
Moreover, divine-‐causation isn’t like models of ordinary causation, for it’s sui-‐<br />
generis (i.e., one of a kind, in its own category, etc.). Lastly, this definition allows<br />
wide views in matters of empirical science. For example, if quantum<br />
indeterminism obtains, that would not falsify determinism in this broad sense,<br />
i.e., determinism per se or determinism simpliciter. 42 So I think this non-‐model-‐<br />
specific definition is a wise one for <strong>Reformed</strong> theologians to endorse.<br />
Suppose we view all the possible models of determinism as members of the set<br />
of possible determining conditions, D. So, D = {D1, D2, D3, D4, . . . Dn}. I am claiming<br />
that those who deny <strong>Reformed</strong> theology is deterministic are denying that it is one<br />
or more members of the set D. However, I am claiming that <strong>Reformed</strong> theology<br />
affirms at least one member of the set D. So, that <strong>Reformed</strong> theology is not Stoic<br />
determinism, “philosophical determinism,” 43 Cartesian determinism, physicalist<br />
causal determinism, logical determinism, etc., does not imply that it is not a kind<br />
of determinism. For lack of a better term, I will call it “theological determinism.”<br />
3.4 A <strong>Reformed</strong> perimeter fence<br />
Based on our very short look at where <strong>Reformed</strong> theology is situated in<br />
discussions of freedom <strong>and</strong> moral responsibility, I think we can walk away with<br />
some propositions out of which we can construct a perimeter fence that I think<br />
all <strong>Reformed</strong> Christians who agree with the Confessional statements I cited<br />
should at least agree with:<br />
41 John Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God (Crossway, 2001), p. 632.<br />
42 Quantum indetermined particles would not be absolutely indeterminate, they<br />
would be indeterminate with respect to laws of physics, not with respect to God’s<br />
decree. Thus, one would not be able to predict their future location given laws of<br />
physics, yet God (or anyone he tells) could still predict it for he determined it.<br />
43 A term I have seen Richard Muller employ several times, though I’m not entirely<br />
clear what it means.
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