Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ... Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
26 Paul L. Manata © 2011 to carry it out. And he will not change it.” Now, the “execution of the plan may require means or be dependent on certain conditions, but then these means or conditions have also been determined in the decree.” And again, “the decree includes whatsoever comes to pass in the world, whether it be in the physical or in the moral realm, whether it be good or evil.” 35 These statements are representative and could be easily multiplied. They explicate the Reformed understanding of God’s decree, providence, and knowledge. Given the above, we can generalize from this to a particular, arbitrary example. Consider Bob. Bob eats Lucky Charms for cereal on some particular rainy morning. We know that God decreed this to happen (“all things”) and that Bob cannot eat grape-‐nuts if God has decreed he will eat Lucky Charms (“unchangeable”), and that the ultimate source of Bob’s action was the decree of God (“after the counsel of his will,” “from all eternity”). 36 However, the decree is free on God’s part 37 and he just as easily could have decreed that Bob eat grape-‐ nuts, from which it would follow that Bob certainly would eat grape-‐nuts—it must occur given the decree. So, what Bob does is not absolutely necessary, it is contingent upon the divine decree. This explication has certain implications for free will; pretty clearly, what we have here is a kind of determinism. 3.3 A kind of determinism? What is determinism? According to Richard Taylor, “Determinism is the general 35 Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Eerdmans, 1996), pp. 100-‐105. 36 Thomas Boston writes, “Whoever may be the instruments of any good to us, of whatever sort, we must look above them, and see the hand and counsel of God in it, which is their first source,” “Important Lessons Drawn from the Decrees of God,” ibid. fn. 30. 37 I bypass the issue of God’s freedom in this paper. I do think it is a sui-‐generis (completely unique) type of freedom. This topic is ripe for philosophical research and I leave the detailed and complicated questions to the side.
27 Paul L. Manata © 2011 philosophical thesis which states that for everything that ever happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen.” 38 Robert Kane elaborates, In more familiar terms, we say that a determined event is inevitable or necessary (it cannot but occur), given the determining conditions. If fate decreed or God foreordained (or the laws of nature or antecedent causes determined) that John would choose at a certain time to go to Samarra, then John will choose at that time to go to Samarra. Determinism is thus a kind of necessity, but it is a conditional necessity. A determined event does not have to occur, no matter what else happens (it need not be absolutely necessary). But it must occur when the determining conditions have occurred. If the decrees of [God] had been different or the past had been different in some way, John may have been determined to go to Damascus rather than to Samarra. Historical doctrines of determinism imply that every event, or at least every human choice and action, is determined by some determining conditions in this sense. 39 On this understanding of determinism conjoined with RT, it becomes easy to see why almost everyone who has thought deeply about these matters—Reformed and non-‐Reformed—has called Reformed theology a species of determinism. But what about Reformed theologians who have claimed Reformed theology is not deterministic, like those cited in 1.2.1? I suggest that those Reformed theologians who have said that Reformed theology is not deterministic can be understood, then, to be operating with some special sense of determinism: perhaps occasionalism, naturalistic causal determinism, absolute necessitation or logical 38 Richard Taylor, “Determinism,” in Paul Edwards ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, v.2 (Macmillan, 1972), p. 359. 39 Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 6, emphasis original.
- Page 1 and 2: Free Will, Moral Responsibility, an
- Page 3 and 4: 5.2 Frankfurt libertarians 5.3 Agen
- Page 5 and 6: 5 Paul L. Manata © 2011 of Calvini
- Page 7 and 8: 7 Paul L. Manata © 2011 biblical r
- Page 9 and 10: 9 Paul L. Manata © 2011 seems to m
- Page 11 and 12: 11 Paul L. Manata © 2011 simply Fr
- Page 13 and 14: 13 Paul L. Manata © 2011 worlds ar
- Page 15 and 16: 15 Paul L. Manata © 2011 deliberat
- Page 17 and 18: 17 Paul L. Manata © 2011 In light
- Page 19 and 20: 19 Paul L. Manata © 2011 As Carl T
- Page 21 and 22: three, we read: 21 Paul L. Manata
- Page 23 and 24: 23 Paul L. Manata © 2011 above con
- Page 25: 25 Paul L. Manata © 2011 Hence we
- Page 29 and 30: no way refute Calvinism. 41 29 Paul
- Page 31 and 32: above. 31 Paul L. Manata © 2011 Of
- Page 33 and 34: 33 Paul L. Manata © 2011 good thin
- Page 35 and 36: 35 Paul L. Manata © 2011 compatibi
- Page 37 and 38: 37 Paul L. Manata © 2011 incompati
- Page 39 and 40: 39 Paul L. Manata © 2011 These kin
- Page 41 and 42: 41 Paul L. Manata © 2011 commits m
- Page 43 and 44: 43 Paul L. Manata © 2011 about the
- Page 45 and 46: 45 Paul L. Manata © 2011 But liber
- Page 47 and 48: 5.3 Agent causation 47 Paul L. Mana
- Page 49 and 50: 49 Paul L. Manata © 2011 idiosyncr
- Page 51 and 52: 51 Paul L. Manata © 2011 contingen
- Page 53 and 54: E.3 Objections 53 Paul L. Manata ©
- Page 55 and 56: 55 Paul L. Manata © 2011 themselve
- Page 57 and 58: 57 Paul L. Manata © 2011 epistemic
- Page 59 and 60: 59 Paul L. Manata © 2011 not rule
- Page 61 and 62: Reformed theologian countenance thi
- Page 63 and 64: the conclusion. 63 Paul L. Manata
- Page 65 and 66: 65 Paul L. Manata © 2011 that ther
- Page 67 and 68: 67 Paul L. Manata © 2011 Apparentl
- Page 69 and 70: 69 Paul L. Manata © 2011 God might
- Page 71 and 72: 6.2 Empirical arguments 71 Paul L.
- Page 73 and 74: 73 Paul L. Manata © 2011 thesis th
- Page 75 and 76: 7. Closing Remarks 75 Paul L. Manat
26<br />
Paul L. Manata © 2011<br />
to carry it out. And he will not change it.” Now, the “execution of the plan may<br />
require means or be dependent on certain conditions, but then these means or<br />
conditions have also been determined in the decree.” And again, “the decree<br />
includes whatsoever comes to pass in the world, whether it be in the physical or<br />
in the moral realm, whether it be good or evil.” 35<br />
These statements are representative <strong>and</strong> could be easily multiplied. They<br />
explicate the <strong>Reformed</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing of God’s decree, providence, <strong>and</strong><br />
knowledge. Given the above, we can generalize from this to a particular, arbitrary<br />
example. Consider Bob. Bob eats Lucky Charms for cereal on some particular<br />
rainy morning. We know that God decreed this to happen (“all things”) <strong>and</strong> that<br />
Bob cannot eat grape-‐nuts if God has decreed he will eat Lucky Charms<br />
(“unchangeable”), <strong>and</strong> that the ultimate source of Bob’s action was the decree of<br />
God (“after the counsel of his will,” “from all eternity”). 36 However, the decree is<br />
free on God’s part 37 <strong>and</strong> he just as easily could have decreed that Bob eat grape-‐<br />
nuts, from which it would follow that Bob certainly would eat grape-‐nuts—it<br />
must occur given the decree. So, what Bob does is not absolutely necessary, it is<br />
contingent upon the divine decree. This explication has certain implications for<br />
free will; pretty clearly, what we have here is a kind of determinism.<br />
3.3 A kind of determinism?<br />
What is determinism? According to Richard Taylor, “Determinism is the general<br />
35 Louis Berkhof, Systematic <strong>Theology</strong> (Eerdmans, 1996), pp. 100-‐105.<br />
36 Thomas Boston writes, “Whoever may be the instruments of any good to us, of<br />
whatever sort, we must look above them, <strong>and</strong> see the h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> counsel of God in it,<br />
which is their first source,” “Important Lessons Drawn from the Decrees of God,” ibid.<br />
fn. 30.<br />
37 I bypass the issue of God’s freedom in this paper. I do think it is a sui-‐generis<br />
(completely unique) type of freedom. This topic is ripe for philosophical research<br />
<strong>and</strong> I leave the detailed <strong>and</strong> complicated questions to the side.
Change language