Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
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16<br />
Paul L. Manata © 2011<br />
making her decision to stay home for the day. Suppose further that a hypnotist<br />
“planted a seed” in Frieda’s mind to make her want to stay home <strong>and</strong> break her<br />
promise. Upon waking she decides to stay home. In this case the decision did not<br />
“originate” in her. To be sure, determinism does not entail we are all hypnotized<br />
to do what we do, but it does seem to entail that our choices <strong>and</strong> actions do not<br />
originate in us in any ultimate sense. Determined agents are sources of their<br />
actions, even important sources, but they are not ultimate sources. Rather, past<br />
history <strong>and</strong> the laws of nature—conditions which obtain prior to <strong>and</strong><br />
independently of determined agents—are the ultimate sources of their actions.<br />
2.4 RT <strong>and</strong> the threat of determinism<br />
The foregoing problems become more acute when we wonder whether RT might<br />
issue in a threat of determinism. For now, suppose it does. That is, suppose that<br />
God’s decree is necessary <strong>and</strong> sufficient for anything that happens to happen.<br />
Suppose that given God’s decree, identical results will obtain in all possible<br />
worlds that have identical decrees. This entails that no one can do other than<br />
God decrees. Suppose further that the ultimate source of all that happens is<br />
God’s decree grounded in his will. For Frieda, this means that she could not do<br />
otherwise than break the promise, <strong>and</strong> her desire to break the promise did not<br />
ultimately originate in her. Yet, <strong>Reformed</strong> Christians (<strong>and</strong> God!) would still want<br />
to say that she freely refrained from feeding the fish <strong>and</strong> that she is morally<br />
culpable for breaking her promise. Generalizing from this arbitrary case to more<br />
problematic cases the above means that if some people end up in hell they could<br />
not have done otherwise <strong>and</strong> they are not the ultimate sources or originators of<br />
their actions. The same applies with minor changes to all the evil in the world, yet<br />
<strong>Reformed</strong> believers would want to say that God is not the author of sin <strong>and</strong> that<br />
the sinner is morally culpable for his or her actions.