Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...

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Paul L. Manata © 2011
worlds are identical up until the moment Frieda choses to either feed the fish or
watch Felicity (or go to the beach, or . . .). The above view of freedom says that in
order for her choice or action to be free, in W1 Frieda chooses to watch Felicity
and in W2 Frieda chooses to feed the fish. This means that the circumstances of
the past don’t determine what Frieda will choose or do. That is: same past,
different futures.
This conception also features prominently in our understanding of moral
responsibility. We may naturally think that when we blame someone—like
Frieda, for not keeping her promise—we are assuming that she could have acted
otherwise. For example, we would not blame Frieda for not feeding the fish if she
had slipped in the bathtub and blacked out until the next morning. Thus ability to
do otherwise seems to many to be a principle that underwrites our ascribing
praise or blame to ordinary people. We sometimes think that ‘ought’ implies
‘can.’ That is, if Frieda ought to feed the fish, then she can do so. The above
principles and maxims represent common understandings of what must be true
for people to be free and morally responsible.
2.3 The threat of determinism
Yet in all this a worry might arise. One might think that science has shown that
we live in a deterministic world. Perhaps the laws of nature together with past
history entail a single possible future. Or, one might not think that physics shows
that we live in a determined world but the evidence from biological,
psychological, sociological, environmental, and economic factors does show this.
Some might think laws of logic determine everything that happens. Some may
think that “the fates” determine all things. And some may wonder if God’s will or
decree determines all that happens. It might even be thought that while the jury
is out on these matters, some form of determinism might be true. If some form