Pritchard, James; From Shipwright To Naval Constructor - Iowa State ...
Pritchard, James; From Shipwright To Naval Constructor - Iowa State ...
Pritchard, James; From Shipwright To Naval Constructor - Iowa State ...
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4 <strong>James</strong> <strong>Pritchard</strong><br />
tween science and technological change.'6 Others specifically concerned<br />
with the history of shipbuilding have identified nontechnical<br />
determinants as obstacles to technical progress. Richard Unger disputes<br />
the common opinion that shipwrights' lack of scientific knowledge<br />
was the primary cause of similarity between warships and cargo<br />
vessels before the 17th century. He shows clearly that differentiation<br />
existed throughout most of the Middle Ages and that it was international<br />
chaos at sea and increasing incidence of piracy in the 16th and<br />
early 17th centuries, rather than shipwrights' ignorance, that constrained<br />
specialization.'7 Two recent accounts of naval shipbuilding<br />
suggest, however, that superior French-warship construction was due<br />
to the early development of scientific education for naval constructors.<br />
But the authors employ an unsatisfactory, traditional, three-stage view<br />
of the technical development of naval architecture: first, shipwrights<br />
built with neither plans nor mathematical calculations; second, builders<br />
drew plans but, as yet, made no use of calculations; and, third,<br />
engineers both designed and computed on the basis of theoretical<br />
principles and mathematics.18 Such an interpretation<br />
both continues to<br />
assume that progress followed the application of science to war making<br />
and ignores the fact that superior construction occurred while ship-<br />
wrights remained in the first and second stages of development.<br />
This article rejects the standard view that French excellence and<br />
perceived superiority in naval shipbuilding during the 18th century<br />
were due to governmental efforts to import technology and foster the<br />
16See A. R. Hall, "Science, Technology and Warfare, 1400-1700" in Science, Technology<br />
and Warfare (n. 3 above), pp. 3-24. Also J. R. Hale's "Commentary," ibid., pp. 25-32,<br />
which supports Hall's argument; also T. S. Reynolds, "Scientific Influences on Technology:<br />
The Case of the Overshot Waterwheel, 1752-1754," Technology and Culture 20 (April<br />
1979): 270-95. For a strong statement on the connection between science and technology,<br />
see A. E. Musson and E. Robinson, Science and Technology in the Industrial Revolution<br />
(Manchester, 1969), esp. pp. 10-59.<br />
'7R. W. Unger, "Warships and Cargo Ships in Medieval Europe," Technology and<br />
Culture 22 (April 1981): 233-52. See also G. M. Walton, "Obstacles to Technical Diffusion<br />
in Ocean Shipping, 1675-1775," Explorations in Economic History 8 (Winter 1970/71):<br />
123-46; and F. C. Lane, "Progres technologiques et productivite dans les transports<br />
maritimes de la fin du Moyen-Age au debut des temps modernes," Revue historique, no.<br />
510 (1974), pp. 277-302. Both point to economic rather than international political<br />
factors.<br />
'8L. Denoix, "Charpentiers, constructeurs, ing6nieurs de vaisseaux," Academie de<br />
Marine, 1954-1955, 1: 5-18; and Paul Gille, "Les lcoles des constructeurs," in Le Navire<br />
et l'economie maritime du Moyen-Age au XVII' sicle, ed. M. Mollat (Paris, 1958), pp. 161-76.<br />
The article by Martine Acerra, "Les Constructeurs de la marine, XVIIe-XVIIIe siecles,"<br />
Revue historique 273 (1985): 283-304, appeared after this essay was accepted for publication<br />
and hints at something more than the traditional emphasis of scientific training on<br />
constructors in its conclusion.