ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

Q: So you took over the Holbrooke role on Bosnia?
PERINA: No one could take over the Holbrooke role, and he did not really give it up.
Even though he was out of government, he frequently called up John Kornblum or me to
find out how things were going and to offer advice. He was clearly worried about the
whole settlement coming apart. It was his legacy. And of course there were difficult
questions that came up regarding the implementation of Dayton. One of the early debates
arose after the indictment of Karadzic and Mladic by the Hague Tribunal. We had
indication that they were hiding in Republika Srpska and being assisted by some people
within the government. The question was how much of an obstacle this should be in our
relations with Republika Srpska, particularly in moving forward with some of the Dayton
provisions such as providing reconstruction assistance and so on. Some people in the
Administration believed that apprehending Karadzic and Mladic was a top priority and
nothing should be provided to Republika Srpska until it extradited them. Other people felt
that blocking Dayton implementation was exactly what Karadzic and Mladic would have
wanted and that we needed to move forward quickly in building relations with the
Bosnian Serbs to develop support for Dayton among the people. I tended to side with the
latter. I felt that Karadzic and Mladic were finished, condemned either to the Hague or to
hiding out for the rest of their lives, and that making them the centerpiece of our relations
with Republika Srpska served only to maintain and enhance their importance. For the
most part, my side lost the debate. Strobe Talbott and even Holbrooke feared that
Karadzic and Mladic would promote resistance to Dayton if they remained at large in
Bosnia. My feeling was that they could not do that to a significant degree if they were
forced to remain in hiding, and that we should not let their presence somewhere in a
mountain hideout restrict our efforts to win over the Serb people. It was a debate that
went on for a long time.
Q: As we speak today ten years later, they’re still in the mountains in Bosnia or Serbia.
How are they able to do this, I mean to avoid capture?
PERINA: How are they able to avoid capture? Well, clearly they do have supporters,
though I think fewer and fewer. There are a lot of extreme nationalists among Serbs, but
also a lot of very decent people. The Serb nation has been very divided politically since
Dayton. The question is how long do you keep on punishing and isolating an entire nation
because some criminals, admittedly very bad criminals, have not been brought to justice?
Should we have delayed the Marshall Plan after World War II until we captured
Eichmann, Mengele, and all the top Nazis? To some degree, we fell into such thinking
after Dayton. The outer wall of sections, linked to Kosovo, was fully justified. But the
obsession with Karadzic and Mladic was exaggerated and complicated the
implementation of Dayton. And the pressure didn’t work because, as you say, they are
still at large ten years later.
Q: Were there elements of anti-Serbism that were pushing this inside or outside the
government??
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