ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

PERINA: Certainly during the period of the sanctions there was an enormous desire
among young people to leave the country. There were no opportunities in Serbia. There
was not even a functioning economy. But not that many Serbs managed to leave because
it was very difficult. Countries clamped down on granting visas, and Serbia was very
isolated. There were not even international flights from Belgrade. Getting out was a real
challenge, even for non-Serbs.
Q: How soon were the sanctions lifted after Dayton?
PERINA: The process of lifting sanctions started right away but it took some time.
Lifting economic sanctions is actually not an easy task. In the U.S., it takes a Presidential
directive to both impose and lift economic sanctions. Political sanctions are easier to
work with. But changes in Serbia were noticeable right away. Within a few months, the
economy was remarkably normalized. What did not change was what we called the
“outer wall of sanctions,” the sanctions we had decided to retain because of the Kosovo
issue. These were mainly political sanctions related to recognition of Serbia-Montenegro,
exchanging ambassadors and so on. They were largely symbolic, but Milosevic was
furious when he realized they would not be lifted. This was the kind of political stigma he
thought he had shaken at Dayton. It was the beginning of a real parting of ways between
Milosevic and Holbrooke. It also marked a divergence between the U.S. and most of our
European allies. The Europeans were not as concerned with Kosovo as we were and did
not support the outer wall of sanctions. Most of them rushed to recognition and full
normalization of diplomatic ties with Serbia. Unfortunately, this sent just the wrong
message to the Kosovar Albanians.
Q: How did the Kosovar Albanians react to Dayton?
PERINA: They were of course disappointed that Dayton had done nothing to address
their problems. Suddenly everyone was rejoicing that peace had returned to former
Yugoslavia but Kosovo seemed to be forgotten. This was greatly damaging to Rugova’s
advocacy of non-violent resistance to Serb domination. Some Albanians were saying that
precisely the lack of violence in Kosovo made it possible for Europeans to forget the
issue. That is why we felt it essential to maintain this outer wall of sanctions. It was a
message to Milosevic but also to the Kosovar Albanians that we had not forgotten
Kosovo. But it was not enough. It was in this period after Dayton that some of the
Kosovar Albanians decided they had to rely more on themselves and started building the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which about a year later took everyone by surprise
when suddenly the Albanians had an army.
Q: What was the role of Albania proper in all of this?
PERINA: I can’t really say definitively but I think it was not large. The Albanian
Albanians were having a lot of domestic problems, both political and economic. In many
ways, the Kosovar Albanians were wealthier and better off than the Albanian ones. There
was also a certain rivalry between Albanian leaders in Albania and Kosovo, almost a
love-hate relationship. I think all of this minimized the role that Tirana played.
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