ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

price for having a very bad leadership which allowed the worst elements of society to
come to the foreground. I don’t think that Serbs are inherently any better or worse than
other nationalities in the Balkans. But they have to this day acquired a very negative
image in the minds of most people in the West.
Q: Well, Germany is still working its way out from under Hitler’s time.
PERINA: True. But I just don’t believe in the concept of collective guilt. I think making
everyone guilty lets everyone off the hook. I believe in individual accountability. But the
reality is that nations do pay the price for the actions of leaders. I understand how it
happens, though it is not fair.
Q: What was your impression of (Croatian President) Tudjman and (Bosnian President)
Izetbegovic?
PERINA: It is difficult for me to say because I really did not interact with them directly. I
met them once or twice and observed them at meetings but do not have any deep
impression. Certainly their demeanor was very different from Milosevic’s. They were
much more formal. Dealing with them was very different, if only because of the language
barrier.
Q: What was your impression of the Milosevic- Holbrooke dialogue at Dayton? Were
there shouting matches between them and the like?
PERINA: I never witnessed a shouting match. That was not Holbrooke’s style, nor
Milosevic’s style. Milosevic wanted always to show how unflappable he was. And
Holbrooke’s real strength was his persistence. He would never give up, even when
somebody else might say this is impossible and walk away. It was often just a matter of
physical duration and energy. Holbrooke could go on very little sleep at night. I saw this
already in his visits to Belgrade. He could go on two hours of sleep at night. Then in the
car on the way to the airport he would say “I have to rest for 10 minutes.” He would close
his eyes in the car and wake up ten minutes later and be all energetic again. Both
Milosevic and Holbrooke were like that. But toward the end of the Dayton talks,
Holbrooke did put on this big bluff that he would declare the conference a failure unless
all three presidents signed on. We in the U.S. delegation were actually instructed to pack
our bags and put them on the sidewalk in preparation for pick-up. He wanted it to really
look like he was ending the conference and would declare it a failure.
Q: What would have been the consequences? Was there an implied consequence like
bombing the Bosnian Serbs again if the conference failed?
PERINA: I never heard Holbrooke say directly we’re going to bomb if this doesn’t work.
But as far as the Serbs were concerned, certainly there was an implication that the
sanctions would get worse, the isolation would get worse, and we would under no
circumstances allow Republika Srpska to secede from Bosnia. In other words, no matter
what the Bosnian Serbs did, they would not achieve their main objective of breaking off
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