ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
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PERINA: We saw the cables, <strong>and</strong> we followed all of the press reports. I knew the<br />
Ambassador, John Menzies. But until we were together at Dayton, we did not have much<br />
direct interaction. The link between all three capitals—Belgrade, Sarajevo <strong>and</strong> Zagreb—<br />
was Holbrooke <strong>and</strong> his traveling entourage. And one of the interesting things about<br />
Holbrooke, which I am sure frustrated a lot of people in Washington, was that he never<br />
reported on his meetings through cables. In the 20 or so visits by him to Belgrade, we<br />
never did a single reporting cable.<br />
Q: This was deliberate?<br />
PERINA: Absolutely. He always said-- <strong>and</strong> he was right in this-- that the more you<br />
report, the more Washington starts interfering in the negotiations. Interagency groups are<br />
set up, instructions drafted <strong>and</strong> circulated, a lot of people who want to get in on the action<br />
start appearing, <strong>and</strong> generally they are not helpful. What Holbrooke did was to call<br />
Warren Christopher periodically <strong>and</strong> brief him orally on the talks. Than, if anyone<br />
wanted a telegram, he would just say that he had already briefed the Secretary <strong>and</strong> that<br />
was that. And he got away with this as far as the State Department was concerned. It was<br />
a little tougher with the other agencies, particularly the Defense Department, because<br />
they did not trust the State Department, either Holbrooke or Christopher. That is why<br />
there were so many DOD representatives on the delegation whom Holbrooke had been<br />
obliged to accept as part of the initial decision to launch talks. These people were all<br />
doing their own reports back to their agencies in Washington. In particular Wes Clark, as<br />
the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would run off after every meeting to send a<br />
report back to his people in the Pentagon. Holbrooke knew this, <strong>and</strong> it irritated him, but<br />
there was nothing he could do about it except—later in the process- start having some<br />
very private, one-on-one meetings with Milosevic to which the agency reps were not<br />
invited.<br />
Q: As the talks started, was it almost implicit that we had the option of bombing the<br />
Bosnian Serbs if the talks did not succeed? Did Milosevic underst<strong>and</strong> this?<br />
PERINA: Yes. That option was always there, <strong>and</strong> Milosevic did underst<strong>and</strong> it because in<br />
fact be<strong>for</strong>e Dayton it happened. We did bomb the Serbs in Bosnia briefly, <strong>and</strong> there was a<br />
huge demonstration, several thous<strong>and</strong> people, in front of the Embassy. It was one of the<br />
few times I was really frightened about things getting out of h<strong>and</strong> but there was an<br />
element of orchestration in the demonstration so that Milosevic did not let it get out of<br />
h<strong>and</strong>. It looked very threatening but remained peaceful. All of this was very ironical<br />
because the Embassy had twice been evacuated be<strong>for</strong>e the Holbrooke talks when we were<br />
threatening the Bosnian Serbs with military action. In each of these cases, all dependents<br />
<strong>and</strong> non-essential personnel were evacuated to Budapest in advance of possible bombing.<br />
In each case, the bombing did not happen, <strong>and</strong> people returned to Belgrade after several<br />
days in the Kempinski Hotel in Budapest. After the second time, it became silly, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
Serbs started making fun of it. They photographed the automobile convoy on the way to<br />
Budapest <strong>and</strong> made jokes about it. So then when we finally did take military action<br />
shortly be<strong>for</strong>e Dayton, the whole Embassy was there <strong>and</strong> no one had been evacuated. I<br />
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