ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

Albanians were very anxious to have Western diplomats, particularly American
diplomats, in Kosovo because they believed it inhibited the Serbs and offered the
Albanians some protection. So having a permanent Embassy office down there was a big
step forward. The fact is the situation in Kosovo was extremely tense. I always believed
that Kosovo would prove more difficult to resolve than Bosnia. In Bosnia, the Serbs,
Muslims and Croats basically spoke the same language, intermarried, and could often not
be distinguished except by their last names. And still they slaughtered one another. In
Kosovo, the gulf was much wider. The Kosovar Albanians had created their own parallel
society that excluded everything Serb. They boycotted Serb schools and set up their own
school system so that a whole generation of Albanians already existed that could not
speak or even understand Serbian. It was clear that the situation was untenable and a
disaster was coming.
Q: How were the Europeans dealing with this situation?
PERINA: Well, everyone would wring their hands when Kosovo was mentioned, but the
Europeans by and large did not know what to do. One got the impression they were
secretly hoping that in fact the Serbs would keep the Albanians in line so that there would
not be an explosion. Some Europeans were reminded of ethnic minority problems in their
own countries and had a lot of sympathy with the Serbs. The most active European
diplomat was the British Chargé, Ivar Roberts. As far as I know, he was the only other
diplomat in Belgrade other than myself and the Russian Ambassador who on occasion
had meetings with Milosevic. But even he underestimated the Kosovo problem. We were
the most engaged Embassy on Kosovo, though even with us it was a secondary issue in
comparison to Bosnia.
The real difference in approach to Kosovo between us and the Europeans was shown
after the Dayton Agreement. Here I have to jump ahead a little. Basically, Milosevic
made the Dayton Agreement possible. He was the key person who forced the Serb
delegation to accept the agreement. Even Holbrooke recognized this. Milosevic did this
because he was not a Serb nationalist but rather a self-serving opportunist. He believed
that if he helped Dayton succeed, he would be seen in the world as a peacemaker and
given legitimacy and respect, the sanctions on Serbia would be lifted, and his role in
starting the whole Yugoslav conflict would be forgotten and forgiven. This is what he
most wanted and why he helped Dayton succeed. The problem was, however, that we
were committed to our promise to the Albanians that we would not forget Kosovo. So
after Dayton we did not lift all of the sanctions but rather stated that an outer wall of
sanctions would remain until the Kosovo issue was resolved. In effect, the economic
sanctions were lifted but the political sanctions, such as non-recognition of Serbia-
Montenegro, remained. Milosevic was furious when he learned that some sanctions
would remain. He felt that he had been tricked, and it was the beginning of his falling out
with Holbrooke.
But also—and this is where the Europeans come in—most of them did not support the
U.S. on the outer wall of sanctions policy. They did not believe that Kosovo should be a
reason for further sanctions on Serbia. Most of them started recognizing Serbia-
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