ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

PERINA: Well, the Europeans were still talking about finding a solution but in fact they
were doing very little. The whole European Union effort largely collapsed. One of the
reasons, however, was that Milosevic did not really want to deal with the Europeans. He
on occasion saw the British Chargé d’Affaires Ivar Roberts, but otherwise he made no
effort to engage with the Europeans. He told us that he wanted to resolve the conflict with
the Americans because only we were objective toward all the parties and did not have
favorites, in the way that, for example, the Germans favored the Croats. He said that only
we were fair and could be trusted. There was, of course, a lot of flattery in this. I think
Milosevic also assumed that if he made a deal with the Americans, the Europeans would
all follow, and he was correct in this. An interesting side point is how he denigrated the
Russians in discussions with us. He did have meetings with the Russian Ambassador, and
the Russians were the most vocal international supporters of Serbia. That is why they had
an ambassador and not a chargé d’affaires—they had no qualms in giving Serbia
diplomatic recognition. But when I asked Milosevic about his dealings with the Russians,
he would say, “The Russians are useless. They’ve got their own problems. They’re not
doing anything. They can’t help in this.”
The Russian position was also interesting. I met a few times with the Russian
Ambassador, who was not a particularly friendly fellow and did not have much contact
with the rest of the diplomatic corps. Clearly, the Russians had some agenda in the region
but they were very weak and had just lost their empire. They could not be expected to
play a powerful role. But what was interesting was how they often misread the situation
in the Balkans. Putting their money on almost full support of Milosevic was not a way to
gain influence in the region. And later, the Russians completely misread and
underestimated the problem of Kosovo, though many other Europeans did that as well.
Q: Was there much contact between your Embassy in Belgrade and the U.S. Embassy in
Zagreb?
PERINA: Not very much, frankly. We read each other’s cables but did not coordinate in
any special fashion. I did communicate on occasion with Peter Galbraith when he became
the Ambassador to Croatia. We met at one of the Department’s chief of mission
meetings, and I in fact invited him to visit Belgrade, which he did and he met Milosevic.
Then we were together quite a bit in Dayton. I think he did a very good job in Zagreb and
respect him for holding the Croats to account for the expulsion of the Serbs from Krajina.
It took courage to do that, and Peter did do it.
Q: Did you ever run across Mrs. Milosevic who was a power in her own way?
PERINA: She certainly was, and she was much talked about for her alleged influence
over Milosevic. She was also joked about as a bit of a kook and dragon lady combined. I
never in my two and one half years there met her. I don’t think I even saw her. But I did
get the sense that Milosevic was really close to her, and that she really did have a lot of
influence over him. He had pictures of her in his office. They stood out in what was
otherwise almost a barren room.
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