ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
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Q: How were you received by the Serbs when you got to Belgrade?<br />
PERINA: Within a week or so of my arrival, I received my first instruction to deliver a<br />
demarche to Milosevic. I had never met him. We did not recognize him as president of<br />
Yugoslavia since we did not recognize Serbia-Montenegro as the successor state to<br />
<strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia. We did accept him as President of Serbia, <strong>and</strong> in that sense were<br />
allowed to call him “President.” I was not an <strong>ambassador</strong>, <strong>and</strong> he knew that was done<br />
intentionally so as not to recognize him as a head of state with any presentation of<br />
credentials. I think Bob Rackmales had not seen him <strong>for</strong> quite a while be<strong>for</strong>e he left. So<br />
Milosevic really had not met with an American diplomat <strong>for</strong> some time. I put in a request<br />
to see him in order to deliver the message from Washington. Later in the same day, we<br />
received a response that Milosevic would not receive me <strong>and</strong> that we should just send<br />
over the message in written <strong>for</strong>m. I knew if I did that, it would set a precedent <strong>and</strong> make<br />
it difficult <strong>for</strong> me to ever get a meeting with him. I decided that we wouldn’t send the<br />
message in written <strong>for</strong>m. Instead, we sent back word that since I had been instructed to<br />
deliver the message personally to him, I would have to report his refusal to see me back<br />
to Washington <strong>and</strong> ask <strong>for</strong> new instructions. This was a bluff, of course, because<br />
Washington had not instructed me personally to deliver the message <strong>and</strong> would have<br />
accepted delivery of the message to him in any <strong>for</strong>m. And I would have hated to tell the<br />
Department that I delayed delivering the first message assigned to me. But I decided just<br />
to tell Milosevic this <strong>and</strong> to wait 24 hours be<strong>for</strong>e sending the demarche in written <strong>for</strong>m.<br />
Well, the bluff worked. About three hours after we said that I would not deliver the<br />
message in writing, word came back that he would receive me that afternoon. I went over<br />
<strong>and</strong> I had my first meeting with Milosevic. Jim Swigert came along as the note taker. I<br />
delivered the demarche orally <strong>and</strong> also left a non-paper with the talking points to make<br />
sure he got the exact wording from Washington. This was the pattern I followed with all<br />
subsequent demarches. In fact, this first meeting ended with him telling me that he would<br />
receive me whenever I asked to see him. I never again had difficulty getting a meeting<br />
with him. He clearly wanted to engage with the United States <strong>and</strong> concluded that he<br />
could do so through me.<br />
I cannot remember the exact content of that first demarche but it was along the same vein<br />
as numerous other messages I delivered that first year—basically all warning him against<br />
interference in Bosnia <strong>and</strong> sometimes warning him very bluntly that the U.S. would take<br />
action if Serbia continued to support the Bosnian Serbs militarily. I probably had well<br />
over a dozen meetings with him that first year. On the first few, I took Jim Swigert along<br />
but then I started seeing him one-on-one because he spoke more openly. His English was<br />
fluent so there was no need <strong>for</strong> interpreters. As I got to know him, the bizarre thing was<br />
that he was actually rather engaging. I think Dick Holbrooke found this later as well. It<br />
was quite intentional on Milosevic’s part. He wanted to engage the U.S. because he knew<br />
that we were key to Western policy in the region. Dealing with him was very in<strong>for</strong>mal<br />
<strong>and</strong> completely unlike dealing with some stuffy head of state. In the meetings, he loved to<br />
drink Johnny Walker Black just straight on the rocks. He was a chain smoker <strong>and</strong> smoked<br />
these cigarillos, not cigarettes but sort of small cigars. For a few months that first year, he<br />
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