ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

the end the decision was affirmative, primarily because OSCE was seen as an
organization that could draw them to the West and help them to develop democratic
institutions. This was how a new, post-Cold War role started to be developed for the
OSCE. But of course during the time I was there none of these countries or very few of
them were prepared to send delegations to Vienna. They didn’t have the personnel,
experience, anything. So for the most part their chairs were empty but at times they asked
the Russians to represent them for important votes and so on. I remember once that a
poor fellow from the Russian delegation ran from chair to chair around the conference
room representing each of the countries as we went around the table on an issue. He
represented Kazakhstan, and then changed seats to represent Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
so on, giving the consensus of each country. There were some incredibly bizarre things
happening in those years.
Q: Let’s go back to early on when the Warsaw Pact started falling apart. How was this
being viewed by the U.S. delegation?
PERINA: Well, we were all intensely following the news, initially from Hungary, where
there was this build-up of East German refugees who were being allowed to go to the
West by the Hungarians. Then, of course, the demonstrations started in East Berlin, and
shortly thereafter the wall came down. I remember the next day the East German
Ambassador was just as white as a sheet when he came in, and it was clear that he could
not believe that this had happened. None of us could believe it had happened, although
we still did not realize the full impact-- that it would lead to the end of the Warsaw Pact
and the Soviet Union. However, events moved very quickly. We had the Velvet
Revolution in Prague and so on. Interestingly enough, no one seemed to fear that the
Soviet Union would intervene and try to stop or reverse developments. It was clear that
something fundamental had changed that could not be reversed. The Brezhnev Doctrine
was dead. At the same time, nobody seriously thought at the time that in the next few
years we would achieve the reunification of Germany with a united Germany remaining
in NATO. Many people thought the more likely scenario was that Germany would leave
NATO in order to achieve reunification, if that was the price that Moscow insisted on.
Q: This was always that fear for a number of years.
PERINA: Right. The fear was that the Germans would be lured out of NATO with the
promise of reunification. Very few people thought that we could attain reunification with
the new Germany remaining in NATO. James Baker did pull it off. It was a remarkable
achievement.
Q: Were you instructed or knew instinctively to be very careful and not indulge in what is
sometimes called triumphalism? In other words, here you are sitting in negotiations
between supposedly equal powers including the very mighty Soviet Union and the other
side is collapsing. This is a tricky time.
PERINA: Well, it was a tricky time and, of course, we did try not to become as you say
“triumphalist”. At the same time it was the highpoint during my career of America’s
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