ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
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these tactics. But of course there was always some concern among all of us that he might<br />
be tricked again in these one-on-one sessions. Reagan had good instincts but he clearly<br />
did not have the grasp of substance that Gorbachev had. He was also vulnerable because<br />
he was basically a nice guy who hated to say no. One of his strengths, however, was that<br />
he knew his limitations. For the most part, he listened to <strong>and</strong> followed his advisors. It was<br />
probably why he was misled in the Iran-Contra affair, but it also prevented him from<br />
getting into trouble on many occasions. Reagan was a great person to work <strong>for</strong> because<br />
he did use the talking points prepared <strong>for</strong> him. He used these 3 x 5 cards but those were<br />
his lines <strong>and</strong> he read his lines. I mean, he was an actor. He was trained to deliver his<br />
lines. It was a fascinating experience because I used to write these lines <strong>and</strong>, whereas<br />
with many people you never knew if they were going to be used <strong>and</strong> probably nine times<br />
out of ten they were not used, with President Reagan there was a very good chance that<br />
what you put on that 3 x 5 card is exactly what he would say. I was in a lot of the Oval<br />
Office meetings, <strong>and</strong> sometimes you could see that if there was something critical or<br />
negative in Reagan’s talking points, he really hated to say it, but in the end he usually did.<br />
He would say it because it was on his card <strong>and</strong> because he knew he was expected to say<br />
it. In that respect he was a pleasure to work <strong>for</strong>, especially to a mid-level officer who was<br />
writing the President’s lines.<br />
This was, of course, very different from my experience working with most other senior<br />
people. For example, I worked <strong>for</strong> the first Bush, <strong>for</strong> George Bush <strong>and</strong> he was quite the<br />
opposite. You could write a briefing book <strong>for</strong> him <strong>and</strong> you would never know if he would<br />
look at it or not because he felt he knew the issues, <strong>and</strong> he very rarely used the talking<br />
points that were given to him. Reagan learned his lines because he knew his limitations<br />
on substance <strong>and</strong> details. But Reagan, at least in my view, had pretty good instincts on<br />
larger issues, like SDI or the Soviet Union. And these came from Reagan himself, not<br />
from his advisors, who were often flustered by them.<br />
Q: I interviewed somebody who was at the White House who talked about how nervous<br />
some of his h<strong>and</strong>lers would be when he was alone with either Brian Mulroney or<br />
Margaret Thatcher. No one knew what he would be saying.<br />
PERINA: That may be true with Margaret Thatcher because they were such friends. He<br />
trusted her <strong>and</strong> did not feel obliged to stick to his lines. But in most instances I think<br />
Reagan could be trusted more than a real expert on <strong>for</strong>eign policy like Henry Kissinger.<br />
Kissinger felt he needed no one. With him, you never really knew what would be done or<br />
agreed to behind closed doors. And you would probably never find out, unless you<br />
trusted his memoirs.<br />
Q: Advisors always tend to be nervous when principals get together. What are they<br />
saying <strong>and</strong> what are they doing?<br />
PERINA: They were certainly worried in Moscow at those on-on-one sessions. During<br />
that Moscow summit there were two one-on-one sessions <strong>and</strong> then there were two<br />
plenary sessions. The plenary sessions involved the whole delegation, including the<br />
Secretary of State, the National Security Adviser, <strong>and</strong> so on. It was a dozen people or so.<br />
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