ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
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to the Soviet Union. Everything that Max Kampelman <strong>and</strong> the negotiators reported to<br />
NATO bore this out. The Soviets were very afraid of SDI <strong>and</strong> wanted desperately to find<br />
ways of stopping or restricting it. But it was something that Reagan—rightly or<br />
wrongly—believed in very strongly <strong>and</strong> would not negotiate away.<br />
Q: I recall that at one point Reagan made a proposal to share the technology with the<br />
Soviets so that we could each stop the other’s missiles.<br />
PERINA: Right. But the Soviets were convinced it was a trick. They could not believe<br />
that we would really share such technology with them, since they would never share it<br />
with us if tables were turned.<br />
Q: Were you getting the sense that the advent of the computer age <strong>and</strong> high tech was<br />
playing into this?<br />
PERINA: This is exactly what I was going to say. You have to put this in the context of<br />
the revolution that was taking place in the United States <strong>and</strong> in the West, with average<br />
people starting to acquire personal computers, <strong>and</strong> kids growing up at home <strong>and</strong> in school<br />
with computer skills. The Soviets saw all this, <strong>and</strong> they were terrified. Their own kids<br />
were still working with an abacus in most of their schools. They saw themselves falling<br />
behind technologically in a way that would be qualitative <strong>and</strong> devastating. They never<br />
expressed it that way but one could sense it in talks with them. I was not an expert on<br />
SDI. I didn't know if it would or would not work. But I saw it as a useful ploy to motivate<br />
the Soviets to change to a freer, more open system that could keep pace with Western<br />
technological development. Their closed, authoritarian system just could not do that. In<br />
conversations, they always tried to pick up on Western skepticism <strong>and</strong> say “Well, SDI<br />
won't work <strong>and</strong> even your own experts say it won’t work.” But I would answer<br />
something like “Well, you know, if you can build a missile that can fly 5000 miles <strong>and</strong><br />
hit a square block, don't you think it would be easier to find some way to throw that<br />
missile off course?” They were very scared that this was indeed true <strong>and</strong> we would beat<br />
them to doing it.<br />
Q: What was your impression of the NATO apparatus? You had been working with two<br />
other allies in Berlin but this was now the entire Alliance trying to work in t<strong>and</strong>em.<br />
PERINA: My overwhelming impression from NATO was that this was basically a U.S.<br />
run organization. One could really sense that. Most of the Allies were quite deferential to<br />
the United States, the French always being a certain exception. In fact, most of the<br />
delegates at NATO tended to be even more pro-American than their governments, or at<br />
least they tried to give us that impression. In my time, we never had a really heated<br />
discussion at NATO, even though I think many Allies were skeptical of some of our<br />
policies such as INF deployment <strong>and</strong> SDI. Whenever Kampelman <strong>and</strong> his colleagues<br />
came up, the questions were invariably softball in nature. NATO was a club <strong>and</strong> largely<br />
our club. It was a very friendly environment <strong>for</strong> the U.S.<br />
Q: What was your impression at the time of how much chance the nuclear <strong>and</strong> space<br />
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