ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

The first Soviet Ambassador for whom I interpreted was Piotr Abrassimov, who was a
Berlin institution. He was a very senior Soviet Ambassador, an expert on Berlin who had
negotiated the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement. After he departed, he was replaced in East
Berlin by Vyacheslav Kochemasov, a less influential Ambassador for whom I also
interpreted at these lunches. The lunches were fun to do, although I learned that
interpreters rarely get a chance to eat and should not even try. The amazing thing about
the lunches, however, was how little substance was actually discussed between the two
Ambassadors. To be sure, there were always a few points that we wanted Arthur Burns to
raise, and the Soviets would have their counterpoints if we raised our points, but by and
large the lunches were social events. This was perhaps a reflection of how stable the
situation around Berlin had become.
Q: Were you picking up any feel about East Germany from the place where you sat, any
sense that the East German government was having a hard time trying to control the
internal situation in the GDR?
PERINA: We didn't really sense that for the simple reason that we tried to avoid dealing
with the East Germans. That was the job of our Embassy in East Berlin, and we tried to
stick to dealing with the Soviets and with the West Germans. We dealt with the West
Germans because we recognized that Berlin was a German city and the occupation would
someday end, but technically we had sovereignty in West Berlin and only delegated the
governing of the city to the Germans. My second job in Berlin, during the last two years
of my tour, was in fact what was called the “Senate Liaison Officer.” This was the liaison
to the West Berlin government. I had an office and permanent staff in the West Berlin
city hall, as did my French and British counterparts. The German city government had to
regularly inform us of developments, and we—that is the Allies—had to concur with
legislation passed by the Berlin senate. Of course, for the most part we did, and a lot of
this had become routinized but it was still a unique situation for a diplomat.
Another example of this was that as Protocol Officer I and my French and British
counterparts always went to the airport to greet the West German President whenever he
came to Berlin and to say good-bye when he was leaving. This was to make the point that
he was visiting somewhere that was not a part of West Germany, and that we the Allies
were in fact the hosts in Berlin. The Presidents, who in my time were Richard von
Weizsacker and Karl Carstens, were always very polite and cordial as we shook hands
but they must have hated this ritualistic reminder that Berlin was not a part of their
country. Actually, the Protocol Officers hated it as well as a real nuisance, but it was a
Berlin tradition.
But the Bonn government of course played a very large role in Berlin and was the de
facto government. One interesting aspect of this was the great rivalry in Berlin between
the two Germanys—East and West. The West Germans put a huge amount of money into
Berlin to keep the city prosperous, deter people from leaving and build this Western
showcase in the middle of the GDR. Much of the city and its cultural life were subsidized
by Bonn. This included everything from the universities to the opera, theater and
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