ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

PERINA: The situation calmed considerably after the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971,
which to a large degree stabilized the way the four allies interacted. There were still big
differences in our interpretations of the Agreement and the status of Berlin, however. The
whole theology of Berlin was extremely complicated. For example, we considered East
Berlin still the Soviet zone of occupied Berlin. However, the Soviets had accepted it as
part of the GDR (German Democratic Republic) and the capital of East Germany. So we
had completely different views on the status of East Berlin, which had real consequences
for actions in many areas. For example, when we traveled to East Berlin, we always
insisted on being checked by Soviet officials, not by East German officials, because we
did not recognize East German sovereignty in East Berlin. If we had any problems in East
Berlin, we complained to the Soviets and not to the East Germans. The GDR officials, on
the other hand, wanted to make the point that this was now their capital, the capital of the
GDR. So a complicated procedure was developed as a type of modus vivendi for dealing
with all these differing viewpoints. Thus, when we crossed from West to East Berlin via
Checkpoint Charlie, we would have these cards that we would show through the car
window to GDR guards, but we would always keep the windows closed and not speak
with the guards. If there were any problems, we complained to the Soviets. The East
Germans came to accept this but were always pushing the envelope in one way or
another. These kinds of practical arrangements were developed to cope in practical ways
with all the contradictions of the situation. Berlin was full of this kind of theology.
There were similarly complex procedures related to road corridors to West Germany and
the air corridors for air traffic. But by and large, the major crises of Berlin had passed by
1981. It was still probably the city with more espionage going on per square mile than in
any other city in Europe simply because it was so easy for each of the four occupying
powers—the U.S., the Soviet Union, the UK and France—as well as the East and West
Germans to spy on one another. Each of the occupying powers had virtual sovereignty in
their sector so they could do anything: control the police, control the phone network,
build radio towers, etc. They were basically the law. So there was a lot of eavesdropping,
everybody listening to everybody else and so on. But overall, the situation was stable
compared to years past.
Q: You were there from 1981 to 1985?
PERINA: Yes, for four years. I had two different jobs in that period. The first was called
the Protocol Officer job but it was actually the job of being the liaison with the Soviets on
Berlin matters. This made sense because I had just come from Moscow, knew Russian
and so on. I had a counterpart in the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin who dealt with me on
Berlin matters. But I did not deal with the East Germans in any way because we had by
that time opened a U.S. Embassy in East Berlin. Since we saw East Berlin as the Soviet
sector of occupied Berlin and not as the capital of the GDR, the phrase we used was to
say that our Embassy was “to the GDR but not in the GDR.” Obviously, there was a lot
of convoluted theology here but it brought stability to the city and to the relationship
between the two Germanys. And it was not just the U.S. that compromised but the
Soviets and East Germans had to as well. A lot of their practical actions were also
inconsistent with the positions of principle they espoused.
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