ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
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there. The Polish economy was nose-diving from all of the strikes <strong>and</strong> unrest. Pol<strong>and</strong> was<br />
going more <strong>and</strong> more into debt <strong>and</strong> economic chaos. As long as this appeared to be the<br />
trend, the Soviets were basically hoping that the example of Pol<strong>and</strong> was negative rather<br />
than positive to the rest of the bloc, <strong>and</strong> that Solidarnosc would collapse as a result of its<br />
own actions. This was very different from Prague in 1968, which the Kremlin clearly<br />
feared would be an example that others tried to emulate. But we spent a lot of time<br />
watching the situation in Pol<strong>and</strong>, knowing that the Soviets did not always think rationally<br />
<strong>and</strong> that hot rather than cool heads could prevail.<br />
Q: Were you able to talk to people at the Polish Embassy about this?<br />
PERINA: We were, <strong>and</strong> they were totally out of the loop, frankly. Nobody was talking to<br />
them. They were very isolated. We as an Embassy tended to know far more than they did<br />
about Soviet attitudes. It was interesting because the Soviets always tried to maintain a<br />
good relationship with us. They knew relations were already damaged because of<br />
Afghanistan but their approach was to try to preserve as much of the relationship as<br />
possible. The poor Poles, however, were clearly ostracized despite being a Warsaw Pact<br />
ally.<br />
Q: Could you go to the Soviets <strong>and</strong> say, “Hey, what's going on in Pol<strong>and</strong>?”<br />
PERINA: We did. We had numerous demarches about Solidarnosc. I was not specifically<br />
involved in those because there were others who were specifically following Pol<strong>and</strong> but<br />
we certainly did raise Polish events with them. We tried to keep up a dialogue, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
Soviets would engage to some degree on this.<br />
Q: What about the institutes like the USA <strong>and</strong> Canada Institute?<br />
PERINA: That was Georgiy Arbatov’s institute. It put itself <strong>for</strong>ward as an independent<br />
think tank, <strong>and</strong> it was the closest thing to a think tank in the Soviet Union so that is the<br />
reason why many Westerners flocked to it. It was, of course, hardly independent, <strong>and</strong><br />
Arbatov was a very clever apologist <strong>for</strong> the Kremlin who knew how to give the<br />
appearance of independence to Western audiences. He saw himself as very skilled in<br />
dealing with Westerners <strong>and</strong> would occasionally be critical of Soviet actions to try to<br />
maintain credibility but in the end almost invariably supported Soviet actions. He was<br />
primarily useful as another voice of the government, but sometimes a more sophisticated<br />
voice than what we heard in the Foreign Ministry or read in the press. So he did serve a<br />
role, though a very disingenuous one.<br />
Q: You went to Berlin in 1981?<br />
PERINA: Yes. In 1981 we moved from Moscow to Berlin.<br />
Q: What was the Berlin situation in 1981 because this was always a city of tension<br />
between East <strong>and</strong> West?<br />
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