ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

very different interpretations. The thing to remember is that it was a political document,
and the entire review process was likewise very political. We focused on certain
principles, and the Soviets focused on others. They would have wanted to use the CSCE
gradually to weaken NATO and to create a new European security system. We wanted to
use the process to advance human rights and overcome the division of Europe, weaken
the Iron Curtain if you will. It was a political debate, and the Soviets could not stop it
with legalistic arguments. They were in a much weaker position because the document
put these human rights issue on the diplomatic agenda, and they could not put the genie
back in the bottle. They could refuse to talk about these provisions, but they could not
stop others from talking about them.
In subsequent years, one of my bosses, Jack Maresca, who worked on negotiation of the
Helsinki Final Act and wrote a book about the CSCE, said that the Soviets considered
walking out of the process a number of times but could not figure out how to do it
because of one provision in the so-called Blue Book, which contained the rules of
procedure of CSCE and was adopted with the Final Act. This provision in the Blue Book
said that no follow-up meeting would end until it had determined the date and place of
the next follow-up meeting. Thus if the Soviets walked out, the meeting would
technically never conclude and would be a constant problem for them on the international
agenda. It could go into recess but then be called back whenever the West wanted to give
Basket III issues prominence again. So it was sort of a Catch 22. It in fact guaranteed the
CSCE perpetual life unless there was a new consensus to change the Blue Book rule.
Q: Could you explain what a refusenik was.
PERINA: Well, a refusenik was basically someone who was being refused a visa to
emigrate from the Soviet Union, and by and large at that time it was primarily Jewish
emigrants who were trying to leave. There were also others, however, like the Baptists
who took refuge in the basement of our Moscow embassy for several years and whom I
met during my later tour there.
Q: So what years did you work in this office?
PERINA: I was in EUR/RPM from the winter of 1976 to the summer of 1978.
Q: Did you get any feel for things happening in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union
at this time that would later lead to the Velvet Revolution, the fall of the Berlin wall and
the events of 1989? Did you sense anything cooking there or was all of this still below the
surface?
PERINA: I certainly did not expect the fall of communism ten years later, or even in my
lifetime. The 1989 events were anticipated by very few experts. But there certainly were
signs of growing dissent and dissatisfaction in Eastern bloc countries. The Final Act was
a perfect example. When it was adopted, the signing countries all agreed that they would
make efforts to publish and disseminate the text to their publics. The Soviets did in fact
publish it widely, probably thinking that the Basket III provisions would get no more
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