ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
very different interpretations. The thing to remember is that it was a political document,<br />
<strong>and</strong> the entire review process was likewise very political. We focused on certain<br />
principles, <strong>and</strong> the Soviets focused on others. They would have wanted to use the CSCE<br />
gradually to weaken NATO <strong>and</strong> to create a new European security system. We wanted to<br />
use the process to advance human rights <strong>and</strong> overcome the division of Europe, weaken<br />
the Iron Curtain if you will. It was a political debate, <strong>and</strong> the Soviets could not stop it<br />
with legalistic arguments. They were in a much weaker position because the document<br />
put these human rights issue on the diplomatic agenda, <strong>and</strong> they could not put the genie<br />
back in the bottle. They could refuse to talk about these provisions, but they could not<br />
stop others from talking about them.<br />
In subsequent years, one of my bosses, Jack Maresca, who worked on negotiation of the<br />
Helsinki Final Act <strong>and</strong> wrote a book about the CSCE, said that the Soviets considered<br />
walking out of the process a number of times but could not figure out how to do it<br />
because of one provision in the so-called Blue Book, which contained the rules of<br />
procedure of CSCE <strong>and</strong> was adopted with the Final Act. This provision in the Blue Book<br />
said that no follow-up meeting would end until it had determined the date <strong>and</strong> place of<br />
the next follow-up meeting. Thus if the Soviets walked out, the meeting would<br />
technically never conclude <strong>and</strong> would be a constant problem <strong>for</strong> them on the international<br />
agenda. It could go into recess but then be called back whenever the West wanted to give<br />
Basket III issues prominence again. So it was sort of a Catch 22. It in fact guaranteed the<br />
CSCE perpetual life unless there was a new consensus to change the Blue Book rule.<br />
Q: Could you explain what a refusenik was.<br />
PERINA: Well, a refusenik was basically someone who was being refused a visa to<br />
emigrate from the Soviet Union, <strong>and</strong> by <strong>and</strong> large at that time it was primarily Jewish<br />
emigrants who were trying to leave. There were also others, however, like the Baptists<br />
who took refuge in the basement of our Moscow embassy <strong>for</strong> several years <strong>and</strong> whom I<br />
met during my later tour there.<br />
Q: So what years did you work in this office?<br />
PERINA: I was in EUR/RPM from the winter of 1976 to the summer of 1978.<br />
Q: Did you get any feel <strong>for</strong> things happening in Eastern Europe <strong>and</strong> in the Soviet Union<br />
at this time that would later lead to the Velvet Revolution, the fall of the Berlin wall <strong>and</strong><br />
the events of 1989? Did you sense anything cooking there or was all of this still below the<br />
surface?<br />
PERINA: I certainly did not expect the fall of communism ten years later, or even in my<br />
lifetime. The 1989 events were anticipated by very few experts. But there certainly were<br />
signs of growing dissent <strong>and</strong> dissatisfaction in Eastern bloc countries. The Final Act was<br />
a perfect example. When it was adopted, the signing countries all agreed that they would<br />
make ef<strong>for</strong>ts to publish <strong>and</strong> disseminate the text to their publics. The Soviets did in fact<br />
publish it widely, probably thinking that the Basket III provisions would get no more<br />
25