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ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

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heard about Jimmy Carter—that he was very h<strong>and</strong>s-on, meticulous, <strong>and</strong> would study in<br />

detail anything that people put in front of him.<br />

The most interesting thing in this period was that I attended part of the first CSCE followup<br />

meeting in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. This was in late 1977 <strong>and</strong> early 1978. In the<br />

Helsinki Final Act it said that periodically there would be follow-up meetings to see how<br />

the document was being implemented. The first such meeting was held in Belgrade, <strong>and</strong><br />

the head of our delegation was Arthur Goldberg, a very prominent <strong>and</strong> senior figure. The<br />

Soviet <strong>ambassador</strong> was Yuri Vorontsov, who later became a deputy <strong>for</strong>eign minister <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>ambassador</strong> to Washington <strong>and</strong> had the reputation of being a very tough guy. With the<br />

personalities of Goldberg <strong>and</strong> Vorontsov, <strong>and</strong> the prominence of human rights in Jimmy<br />

Carter’s <strong>for</strong>eign policy, Belgrade had all the ingredients <strong>for</strong> a clash between the U.S. <strong>and</strong><br />

the Soviet Union. This in fact happened.<br />

I wasn't on the delegation the whole time but I was there <strong>for</strong> probably about half of the<br />

conference in 1978. There was a debate within our delegation <strong>and</strong> later within the NATO<br />

caucus on whether Western delegations should name names of dissidents in the Soviet<br />

Union. The Soviets considered just the subject of human rights to be interference in<br />

internal affairs, <strong>and</strong> naming names of specific dissidents like Natan Sharansky or Yuri<br />

Orlov was unprecedented <strong>and</strong> seen by some of our allies as too provocative. Many of our<br />

European friends were concerned that the Soviets might use it as an excuse to walk out of<br />

the conference <strong>and</strong> thus kill the entire CSCE process. Goldberg mulled the issue over <strong>and</strong><br />

decided that he would name names. We prepared a speech where he referred to several<br />

prominent dissidents, including Sharansky <strong>and</strong> Orlov, whose names were known in the<br />

West. I remember when he delivered the speech in the plenary how everyone held their<br />

breath on how the Soviets would react. Well, they denounced the speech but did not walk<br />

out of the meeting. They stayed but maintained their argument that this was not a<br />

legitimate discussion topic <strong>and</strong> that it was interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet<br />

Union. Of course, when Goldberg read his statement, the Soviets knew of it in advance<br />

<strong>and</strong> Vorontsov himself didn't attend. He sent his deputy.<br />

These Basket III issues dominated the whole meeting. There were also many less<br />

prominent names, particularly of refuseniks, which we were asked by Congress <strong>and</strong><br />

others to raise with the Soviets. We had a list of several hundred names which we could<br />

not raise orally in the meeting. So we attached the names to a diplomatic note which we<br />

sent to the Soviet delegation. The lists came back to us seemingly unread with the<br />

notation that they were not an appropriate topic <strong>for</strong> discussion between the United States<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Soviet Union. Basically, the argument the Soviets tried at that time <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> many<br />

years thereafter was to say that this was not the business of the United States or any other<br />

country—that we were interfering in their internal affairs. This was a very weak,<br />

legalistic-type of argument which predictably did not work or deter the United States.<br />

Q: The Helsinki Accord did also have a provision on interference in internal affairs, no?<br />

PERINA: Yes, it did have such a provision. The Helsinki Final Act was a consensus<br />

document, <strong>and</strong> thus it had a lot of internal contradictions, or at least provisions open to<br />

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