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ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

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PERINA: Relations with Europe were not good in this period. It was actually the worst<br />

period in transatlantic relations that I saw during my entire career. Given the amount of<br />

sympathy <strong>and</strong> support we received from the Europeans right after 9/11, the reversal in the<br />

relationship was dramatic. The parting of ways, of course, came with Iraq. The Western<br />

Europeans were angry at us <strong>for</strong> invading without a Security Council resolution, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Administration here was furious at the Western Europeans, <strong>and</strong> particularly France, <strong>for</strong><br />

frustrating ef<strong>for</strong>ts to get a resolution. This anger at France was picked up by the whole<br />

country, with the Freedom Fries <strong>and</strong> so on. It was a real low point in our relations with<br />

Europe. The exceptions were the UK <strong>and</strong> the new democracies of Central <strong>and</strong> Eastern<br />

Europe—the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Romanians <strong>and</strong> so on, the New Europe as<br />

opposed to the Old Europe in Donald Rumsfeld’s lexicon. The relationship with the UK<br />

reflected the very close Bush-Blair relationship. There seemed to be a real personal<br />

friendship between the two men. They spoke frequently on the telephone, often at length<br />

<strong>and</strong> in great detail about Iraq <strong>and</strong> world developments. As <strong>for</strong> Eastern <strong>and</strong> Central<br />

Europe, we were still popular there thanks to the legacy of the Cold War <strong>and</strong> our image<br />

as the power that stood up against Soviet despotism. Even in those years, however, one<br />

could see this goodwill toward America dissipating as these countries began to have their<br />

own doubts about Iraq <strong>and</strong> started maneuvering <strong>for</strong> EU membership. The Policy Planning<br />

Staff still had its established contacts <strong>and</strong> consultations with our European counterparts<br />

but the broader relationship was very cold. Interestingly, this did not seem to bother many<br />

in the Administration. Europe was seen as an economic partner but not a real political<br />

<strong>for</strong>ce in the world. The analyses were all that it would become weaker <strong>and</strong> less relevant<br />

to U.S. security interests. Russia sparked some concern, but it was also seen as weak <strong>and</strong><br />

non-threatening. Not a lot of attention seemed to be paid to it by senior Administration<br />

officials. The real new power on the horizon was China. It received a good deal of<br />

attention.<br />

Q: How so?<br />

PERINA: China was seen as the economic giant who was the main rival of the U.S. <strong>for</strong><br />

global resources <strong>and</strong> whose political development had not kept pace with its economic<br />

development. There was a lot of concern <strong>for</strong> a certain period about Chinese-Taiwanese<br />

relations. The Taiwanese were seen as unpredictable, <strong>and</strong> the Chinese were seen as<br />

having a rather unrefined, undeveloped policy toward the isl<strong>and</strong>. The real nightmare<br />

scenario was a conflict breaking out between them which would put pressure on the U.S.<br />

to intervene.<br />

Q: What about Iran? Was there any support <strong>for</strong> trying to open a dialogue with it?<br />

PERINA: I was not aware of any during my time on the Planning Staff. I heard that there<br />

had been some attempts through diplomatic channels during the Powell years but that the<br />

Iranians had shown no interest. There was a feeling among the experts that the internal<br />

political situation in Iran would make it very difficult <strong>for</strong> any leader to admit to a<br />

dialogue with the United States. The Iranians were not ready <strong>for</strong> that. The Administration<br />

also still held to a tough line on the axis of evil countries. Being tough was seen as the<br />

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