ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

did not dispel this. Senior career officers who were most closely identified with Powell
did not fare well. A large number retired. They were replaced by people she brought in,
primarily from the NSC or her Stanford days. All of this, of course, is the prerogative of
the Secretary of State, and most do want their own team. But there was an exceptional
tension in this transition.
Q: To what degree did Iraq dominate the foreign policy agenda? How much attention
was given to other issues?
PERINA: By the time I arrived, the Policy Planning Staff paid more attention to other
issues simply because there were so many people elsewhere working Iraq that there was
not very much our small office could contribute. But for the Department and the
government as a whole, Iraq was the gorilla in the room. That was the main focus of U.S.
policy, particularly as the insurgency grew. Beyond Iraq, there were the broader issues of
the Middle East and the Muslim world. The Policy Planning Staff did work on these
issues, particularly in developing ideas on how to promote reform, democracy and
economic development in Muslim countries. After these big issues came some secondary
issues such as Iran, North Korea, Venezuela and so on. They were on the radar screen of
the Department principles, though not consistently. After that, however, most issues were
worked at fairly low levels in the State Department. There were exceptions, of course.
Colin Powell took a lot of interest in Darfur and tried to do something about it. He was
the first major leader to call what was happening there genocide.
Q: Did the Policy Planning Staff work on that?
PERINA: We did. Our Africa expert, Makila James, did a lot of work on it. It was a very
complicated situation, with roots in Sudan’s civil war and also in deep-seated ethnic
enmity. The only way to stop the killing quickly would have been to put in some sort of
peacekeeping force but nobody was up to that. The U.S. was bogged down in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the Europeans played with the idea but backed away when they saw the
commitment required, the African Union claimed to want to do it but completely lacked
resources. Thus people focused on diplomatic efforts which were very frustrating and
manipulated by the Sudanese Government. People in the West understood the enormity
of the tragedy-- over two million displaced people and hundreds of thousands, perhaps
half a million, killed. But many people did not understand the enormity of the task. Many
imagine a small region like Kosovo but in fact Darfur is about the size of France, with
almost no infrastructure. Policing a region like that is a real challenge, and the
international community’s efforts in the political arena basically failed. Those who really
do deserve a lot of credit are the humanitarian organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental,
who delivered the food and relief supplies to keep so many of the
displaced alive. They are the unsung heroes of the international community. I found
much the same thing in Yugoslavia. The UN was rightly criticized for its political failure
in dealing with the Bosnian war but UN humanitarian relief agencies did a very good job
in helping the civilian population survive the conflict. They deserve a lot of credit.
Q: Was there much attention on the planning staff paid to Europe in this period?
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