ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
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a huge personal embarrassment. It led to a major deterioration in Russian-Moldovan<br />
relations.<br />
Still, the Russians have never given up on the Kozak approach to resolving this conflict,<br />
<strong>and</strong> they continue to put pressure on Voronin to accept such an approach. He has so far<br />
resisted, to his credit, but he is unpredictable in these things <strong>and</strong> could still change his<br />
mind. I like to think that I played a role in preventing him <strong>for</strong> signing the 2003 document,<br />
though the situation was such that there were other Western governments démarching<br />
him at the time, <strong>and</strong> our bilateral Ambassador Heather Hodges also delivered a <strong>for</strong>mal<br />
demarche from Washington against signing the memor<strong>and</strong>um. In retrospect, however, I<br />
think the factor that influenced Voronin most were the domestic demonstrations. By<br />
coincidence this also happened to be the weekend that Shevardnadze was toppled from<br />
power in Georgia by demonstrations—the weekend of the Rose Revolution. I think this is<br />
what scared Voronin most. He saw what happened to Shevardnadze. While Moldova’s<br />
demonstrations were still manageable, Voronin did not want to take the chance of the<br />
same thing happening to him <strong>and</strong> that is why he decided not to sign.<br />
Q: Given all this, what was your assessment of the U.S. role in all of these frozen<br />
conflicts? Was there really a role <strong>for</strong> the U.S.?<br />
PERINA: I think there was a role in two respects. First, as I mentioned, it is important to<br />
keep a negotiating process, a diplomatic track, going in all of these conflicts. If there is<br />
no diplomatic activity, the only alternative <strong>for</strong> those wishing to change things is war. The<br />
participation of the U.S. is important to giving most of these negotiations credibility <strong>and</strong><br />
support. Secondly, the U.S. role is also important as a counter-weight to the Russians.<br />
The Moldovans <strong>and</strong> others understood this, <strong>and</strong> that is why they always wanted the U.S.<br />
engaged in the negotiations. The European Union, <strong>for</strong> all its good ef<strong>for</strong>ts, is still not<br />
cohesive or organized or fast enough to be able to st<strong>and</strong> up to the Russians when it<br />
becomes necessary. At the same time, I think it is true that none of these conflicts can be<br />
resolved without Russian cooperation. Russia’s influence in this part of the world is just<br />
too great <strong>and</strong> likely to remain so. In the case of Transnistria, Abkhazia <strong>and</strong> South Ossetia,<br />
Russia is in fact the key factor that perpetuates the conflicts. In the case of Karabakh, the<br />
Russians cannot <strong>for</strong>ce a settlement but they can be spoilers <strong>and</strong> prevent one if they<br />
choose to do so.<br />
Q: Did you sense that Russia was becoming more adversarial <strong>and</strong> hardline in its<br />
policies? Were people starting to become more worried about Russian policies?<br />
PERINA: We spent a huge amount of time trying to figure out Russian policy <strong>and</strong> what<br />
they were really up to. It was very difficult because the policies were so often seemingly<br />
inconsistent <strong>and</strong> contradictory. The Russians would say one thing <strong>and</strong> act completely<br />
differently. Part of this, of course, might be attributed to basic duplicity, <strong>and</strong> I am sure it<br />
was, but it was also more complicated. The Presidents in the region such as Voronin <strong>and</strong><br />
Shevardnadze all complained to me about their frustrations with the Russians. Voronin in<br />
particular would tell me how Putin promised him something but then it never happened. I<br />
once asked Trubnikov, the Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister whom I got to know<br />
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