ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

than no settlement at all because it would have been a permanent, institutionalized
Russian presence within Moldova and a permanent economic drain on the country.
Q: Was there a real chance of this happening?
PERINA: Absolutely. We in fact came very close to it in December 2003 with the socalled
Kozak Memorandum. Dmitriy Kozak, a close confidante of Putin’s and his deputy
chief of staff, suddenly showed up in Moldova in the fall of 2003 with a mandate to
resolve the Transnistria conflict. He did all of the negotiation in shuttle diplomacy
between Voronin and Smirnov, and it was a unilateral Russian effort. None of the other
mediators were involved. I visited Moldova in late September when he happened to be in
town and asked to meet with him. We met for drinks in the lobby of the Jolly Alon Hotel.
Kozak was pleasant enough but gave very little information on the substance of the
negotiations. He described it as a type of memorandum dealing with the principles of a
settlement but not containing many details on implementation. I specifically asked him if
there was a military component, such as the question of a peacekeeping force, and he said
there was not. A few months later, in mid-November, we were in Moscow with EUR
Assistant Secretary Beth Jones to conduct consultations in preparation for the Maastricht
OSCE Ministerial meeting, scheduled to be held in early December. It was then that the
Russians first showed us a draft of the document being negotiated. They also told us that
Voronin had agreed to sign it. Everyone was in total shock. The document was terribly
slanted in favor of Transnistria. It outlined a federal structure which retained almost all of
Transnistria’s independence but also enhanced its influence within Moldova through the
legislative structure. The Transnistrians acquired de facto veto power over major
Moldovan policy decisions, including on matters of foreign policy. There was also an
annex allowing Russian troops to remain in Moldova for twenty years, and perhaps
longer. It would have made Moldova a permanent hostage of the Transnistrians.
The Russians wanted the document signed by Voronin and Smirnov prior to the
Maastricht Ministerial meeting, and they thus knew they had to make it public. They put
it on an internet website, where it began circulating. The reaction was outrage, not just
among Western governments but also among Moldovans. By late November, there were
demonstrations in Chisinau of up to 50,000 people by some estimates protesting the
memorandum. It seemed neither Voronin nor Kozak had anticipated such a reaction, but
Putin was going forward with plans to fly to Chisinau for the signing ceremony early in
the week of November 23. I was in Vienna at this time involved in the final OSCE
preparations for Maastricht. I remember walking along the street in the early afternoon of
November 21 and getting a call on my cell phone. It was Voronin’s office saying that he
wanted to speak with me. He got on the line and asked me what I thought the U.S.
reaction would be if he signed the memorandum. I told him that it would be very
negative, and that he would lose the support of the United States and most other Western
countries as well. He told me he was reconsidering the entire memorandum and would
make a decision that weekend. Well, as we later found out, on the eve of Putin’s
departure for Chisinau, Voronin told the Russians he would not sign and cancelled the
signing ceremony. We heard from many sources after that that Putin was just furious at
Voronin. What Putin hoped would be a triumph of Russian peacemaking turned out to be
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