ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

were about three-quarters of the population of Karabakh before the war would have won
the referendum but the occupied territories around Karabakh would have been returned to
Azerbaijan in any case. So the outcome would have been similar to Key West but more
managed and in response to a more acceptable process, i.e. a referendum, rather than just
the result of a war. This would have been a final resolution of the conflict. The way the
referendum idea developed after I left, however, was somewhat different. It became a
means to postpone a final resolution of the conflict to a referendum many years down the
road but to set up an agreed interim solution that would stabilize the conflict and allow
the occupied territories to be returned to Azerbaijan and the economic blockade of
Armenia to be lifted. Determining the final status of Karabakh would thus be kicked
down the road but under terms that all agreed upon and that would stabilize the situation.
It was a fair approach. Sometimes freezing a conflict under agreed terms can be a way of
resolving it, for all practical purposes.
Q: Does Nagorno-Karabakh have a land connection to Armenia?
PERINA: No, not geographically. This was another big problem. The Armenians were
holding a land corridor from the war that connected the two but the corridor was outside
of Nagorno-Karabakh proper. So the question of what corridor could be agreed upon in a
settlement was an issue. The Armenians of course wanted a corridor with the most
security, something that would have more or less the same status as Karabakh. For
Azerbaijan, this was clearly both a political problem and a practical one since it would
divide regions within Azerbaijan unless it could be crossed and also used by Azerbaijani
citizens. This was one of the issues that led to the failure of Key West. It is an issue that
comes up with every proposed resolution scheme, but it will have to be part of any final
resolution.
Q: How was team cooperation among the three Co-Chairs? Could you work well with the
French and Russians?
PERINA: I have to tell you that in this case we worked very well together, all three of us.
This may have been because it was a conflict that no one could really control, not even
the Russians. It was a true indigenous conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It
wasn’t like the other secessions that I worked on, those in Georgia and Moldova, that
were assisted by Russia and only viable with Russian support. With Nagorno-Karabakh,
Russia could possibly bloc a settlement but it could not make one happen. Nobody could
force a settlement on the Armenians and the Azeris. It was too big and too emotional an
issue for both sides. So there was less opportunity for Russia to pursue its own agenda.
With the French, I think we were very lucky with the negotiators. The first French
Ambassador I worked with, Philippe de Suremain, was absolutely first-rate. He later
became the French Ambassador to Kiev. Sometimes the three of us, that is the three Co-
Chairs, were telling one another that if we could find a solution to this conflict it would
be an important symbol of the United States, Russia and the European Union, as
represented by France, jointly resolving a real international problem. It was a nice idea
but it did not work, though the fault was not lack of Co-Chair cooperation. The problem
was the complexity of the problem and the intransigence of the parties. My own personal
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