ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
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Q: How was it working with the Armenians?<br />
PERINA: I think we worked quite well with them also, although Kocharian was a very<br />
tough negotiator. Too tough, in my view. I think he lost some good opportunities by not<br />
being a little more flexible. The real asset on the Armenian side was the Foreign Minister,<br />
Vartan Oskanian, who was very capable <strong>and</strong> engaging to work with. He was born of<br />
Armenian parents in Syria but had in fact been raised in the United States <strong>and</strong> became a<br />
U.S. citizen be<strong>for</strong>e moving to independent Armenia. He was very straight<strong>for</strong>ward <strong>and</strong><br />
in<strong>for</strong>mal but still very effective. It was like dealing with an American.<br />
Q: So what was the status of the talks when your assignment ended?<br />
PERINA: Well, I am glad you ask that because in fact it was not all bleak. We did make<br />
some progress, <strong>and</strong> it stemmed from an idea I got when reading about the EU-managed<br />
referendum on independence in Montenegro. It occurred to me that the concept of a<br />
referendum as a way of dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had not been<br />
explored in previous negotiation attempts. I first raised the idea one evening in July 2002<br />
on the grounds of the Stirin Palace with the Armenian representative, Tatoul Markarian.<br />
This was during the second <strong>for</strong>mal meeting of the Prague Process. He seemed very<br />
skeptical but said he would report it to his boss, Foreign Minister Oskanian. A few days<br />
later he drew me aside <strong>and</strong> said that the Armenian side was not interested in this<br />
approach. I assumed it was because the Armenians were still hoping to somehow<br />
resurrect Key West. In any case, I thought the referendum idea was dead. But then about<br />
a year later, both Markarian <strong>and</strong> Oskanian started telling me that they would be interested<br />
in exploring this. They even started asking me to put it <strong>for</strong>mally on the table. I think it<br />
was because the Azerbaijani message got through that there was no way in the world<br />
Baku would return to the Key West approach. We sounded out the Azeri side about the<br />
referendum, <strong>and</strong> they also were initially very skeptical. Then in late 2003 Aliyev told us,<br />
that is to say the Co-Chairs, that he was willing to discuss this idea. Agreement on this<br />
approach led to the elevation of the Prague talks to the level of Foreign Minister. By the<br />
time I had my last meeting as a Minsk Group Co-Chair with the Azeri <strong>and</strong> Armenian<br />
Foreign Ministers in April 2004 in Prague, the referendum approach was the major one<br />
on the table. In fact, despite a lot of permutations since then, it is basically the approach<br />
that my successor Steve Mann worked on <strong>and</strong> his successor Matt Bryza has worked on.<br />
Un<strong>for</strong>tunately though, as is obvious, it also has not brought any resolution of the conflict,<br />
at least not so far.<br />
Q: How was the referendum supposed to work? Who would participate?<br />
PERINA: Well, you touch on a key issue because in fact the concept of how the<br />
referendum would work has evolved a lot since the original idea that I had. The way I<br />
imagined it was that all of the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh prior to the conflict who<br />
were still living would be eligible to vote. There apparently were registration lists from<br />
the Soviet days that would make it possible to identify them. There would be polling<br />
places in Azerbaijan <strong>for</strong> the refugees, <strong>and</strong> so on. It would be difficult but it was possible,<br />
<strong>and</strong> the OSCE would have organized the voting. In all likelihood, the Armenians who<br />
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