ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...

we physically crossed the front lines from Azerbaijan into Nagorno-Karabakh. It was a
revealing but very difficult experience. It had to be worked out with both sides, of course.
Both sides had to clear a path through the minefields. We then walked for several
hundred yards along this path, which was only about a yard wide and marked with a
string, in single file and carrying our suitcases. I could literally see some of these mines
sticking out of the ground on both sides of the path. It was frightening. Worst of all, one
of the Azeri soldiers who was clearing the minefield triggered a mine and lost a leg about
15 minutes before we crossed. We just heard an explosion and commotion and then
learned what happened. We arranged through the OSCE to give some monetary
compensation to the soldier and to his family but how can you compensate someone for
the loss of a leg? After that, I told the other Co-Chairs that it was the first and last time I
would cross in this fashion because it was not worth the cost of people getting hurt. The
Azeris agreed that we could go into Nagorno-Karabakh from the Armenian side, even
though politically they did not like it.
Q: What was keeping the negotiations from making some progress?
PERINA: There were a number of reasons why the talks didn’t progress. One of them
was that both sides felt that time was on their side. The Azeris felt they were going to get
all of this incredible oil revenue and they would be able to increase their military strength
and overwhelm the Armenians who were losing population through emigration and in
bad economic straits. On the other hand, the Armenians also felt that time was on their
side simply because they were holding the land and creating a type of fait accompli. One
Armenian said to me, “In a generation, how many young Azeris will want to die for
Nagorno-Karabakh?” But both sides were wrong in thinking that time worked for them.
The Azeris were wrong in thinking that oil money translates easily into military prowess.
If that were true, the Middle East would look very different than it does today. It is just
not that simple. But the Armenians were also wrong in thinking that people in this part of
the world forget old grudges and conflicts. In fact, these issues are passed remarkably
from generation to generation, as is the case among Armenians themselves. So both sides
were mistaken in their views but it made resolution of the conflict very difficult.
Another complication we had in the talks was that in December 2003 President Heydar
Aliyev of Azerbaijan died. He passed away in the U.S., in the Cleveland Clinic, where he
was being treated for heart problems that he had had for many years. He had arranged
things so that his son Ilham Aliyev would be the likely successor as President, but we still
lost about a year through the whole process of transferring power from the old Aliyev to
the son. It was also a setback because the older Aliyev was an extremely powerful figure
in Azerbaijan. We always assumed that he, if anyone, had the political strength to make
the kinds of compromises that would be needed for a settlement. The son Ilham was
politically weaker and had acquired a reputation as a bit of a playboy and not a serious
leader. However, I must say that when he became President and the Co-Chairs started
working with him, we were all very impressed by how intelligent and capable he actually
was. He was a serious and thoughtful interlocutor. That was a welcome surprise, although
we still lost a lot of time with the transfer of leadership.
109