ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
ambassador rudolf v. perina - Association for Diplomatic Studies and ...
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Anyway, to get back to the negotiations, there had over the years been many proposals by<br />
the Minsk Group Co-Chairs to find a solution <strong>and</strong> each one had been rejected by one side<br />
or the other. They included the basic ways one can solve a conflict like this: mediation,<br />
territorial exchange, autonomy, confederation <strong>and</strong> so on. The Key West approach, which<br />
was sort of a l<strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> peace swap, also failed. Ironically, most of these deals failed over<br />
what by an outsider could be considered secondary issues, issues like the status of the<br />
corridor between Armenia <strong>and</strong> Nagorno-Karabakh since they are not contiguous. This<br />
was the case also in Key West, although there is debate still on whether the leaders really<br />
see these issues as important or just make the secondary issues deal-breakers because<br />
they get cold feet on the whole approach <strong>and</strong> just want to get out of it. Key West, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, was a very good deal <strong>for</strong> the Armenian side, probably the best deal they had<br />
ever been offered. But Azerbaijani President Aliyev started raising objections on<br />
secondary issues, <strong>and</strong> Kocharian did not show any flexibility to accommodate him, so it<br />
all came apart, <strong>and</strong> it was a real shame. Things really seemed at a dead end.<br />
Q: So this where you took over?<br />
PERINA: This is where I took over <strong>and</strong> tried to figure out how to move <strong>for</strong>ward. I was<br />
the new Co-Chair. The Russians <strong>and</strong> French were a bit burned out by Key West, <strong>and</strong> they<br />
looked to me, to the U.S., <strong>for</strong> new ideas. For a few months, I did try to see if it was at all<br />
possible to resurrect the Key West approach but in fact it was not. The two Presidents<br />
were in a bad mood. They were angry at one another <strong>for</strong> the failure of Key West, <strong>and</strong><br />
accusing each other of bad faith. I realized we might be facing a real lull in negotiation<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e new ideas could be developed. But a lull could be very dangerous in terms of<br />
public perceptions in Azerbaijan. The Azeris were the side most frustrated with the status<br />
quo. They saw their l<strong>and</strong> as occupied <strong>and</strong> wanted progress in resolving this. If they had<br />
no perception of an ongoing negotiation, then the Azeri public might start concluding that<br />
war was the only way to change things. For this reason it was important to maintain a<br />
process, at least an ongoing dialogue that showed people the sides were still talking with<br />
one another.<br />
I laid out this idea to the other Co-Chairs at a meeting in Washington in December 2001.<br />
I said that we had to dem<strong>and</strong> that the two Presidents agree to regularly-scheduled<br />
meetings at a neutral location to which they would send their personal representatives. If<br />
the representatives did nothing but stare at each other <strong>for</strong> a day, so be it. But we would<br />
<strong>for</strong>ce them to continue having meetings <strong>and</strong> keep the structure of a process in place. The<br />
two other Co-Chairs agreed, <strong>and</strong> we started sounding out the two sides. They were both<br />
very receptive because they also understood that a visible process of negotiation was in<br />
their interest. To be sure, there were some hitches. At first, the Armenian side insisted<br />
that the Karabakh Armenians had to be included. Recent talks had all been just between<br />
Aliyev <strong>and</strong> Kocharian, <strong>and</strong> we knew that Aliyev would not agree to including two<br />
Armenian reps. Kocharian dropped this, <strong>and</strong> other problems were worked out. During a<br />
visit that we the Co-Chairs made to Yerevan <strong>and</strong> Baku in March 2002, the two presidents<br />
<strong>for</strong>mally agreed to start new negotiations through their Personal Representatives. We<br />
later agreed that these would take place in Prague, <strong>and</strong> this was the start of what came to<br />
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