Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself - College of Stoic Philosophers

in 4 STOIC DOGMA Ixxxiii
grapple with the central difficulty, the origin and existence
of irregular and irrational impulses in the soul, or
show how their presence is compatible with a nature that
is altogether good.' 1
All alike are operations of the
Pneuma, and the Pneuma is divided against itself. If
lusts and affections, good desires and bad, all spring from
the same fountain-head, every guarantee for the eventual
prevalence of good is withdrawn. The destiny of
creation reveals itself in never-ending cycles of unprogressive
conflict, and no thought of moral evolution
enters in to brace endeavour or justify optimism. As
part of this predestination, the basis of individual virtue
itself becomes precarious. Such are some of the diffi-
culties involved in the Stoic scheme.
To this extent then and by this route Greek thought
approached the moral problems of 'free-will,' which it
bequeathed in intensified form to Christianity. The
Stoics did not push the issue to its ultimate contradic-
tions ; circumscribing and in effect sacrificing free personality,
they were content to leave the conception of
Order supreme and paramount ; and their problem was
not complicated by the idea of life as probation, by any
doctrine of reward or punishment in a life to come, or
for the remission of sins. The
by any need of provision
diseased or rebellious member might suffer loss; it
might estrange
or excommunicate itself as some mal-
2
content from the social it system ; might entail upon
itself forfeitures, pains, disabilities, or death; it might
become a kind of tumour 3
or excrescence on the : body
1
Compare p. Ixv.
2 ii. 16 ; viii. 34 ; ix. 23.
3 iv. 29.