Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself - College of Stoic Philosophers

in 4 STOIC DOGMA Ixxvii
of virtues, concepts, moral or aesthetic qualities, and such
like, do not involve the corollary, that such qualities or
conceptions admit of sensuous perception only, but on
the contrary themselves imply that, even on the material-
istic assumption, mind can come in contact with things
external to itself through other organs than those of
sense. The fact that virtue or beauty or number or God
is in Stoic phraseology 'a body,' does not preclude it
from being perceived by some other organ of soul than
the five organs of sense. The reason or understanding,
the psychical as well as the sensuous activities of the
immanent soul, are no less '
bodily '
than the senses, and
it seems correct and consistent (in spite of strong counter
assertions)
tions of reason '
to believe that the Stoics admitted '
percep-
as well as '
perceptions
place in their theory of knowledge.
of sense '
to a
Without this admis-
sion it is difficult to understand how authority could be
claimed for any abstract conceptions, or for existences
that lie outside the range of sensuous perception. To
these perceptions of the reason the same note of authority,
varying with the completeness of the apprehension and
representation, will attach as to the perceptions of sense
already discussed. Thus then the means and bases of
knowledge are twofold, first the organs of sense, secondly
certain organs of apprehension resident in reason and
forming elements in the unique constitution of the
human mind. These inborn elements of reason have a
specific name (TrpoArjj/'as) attached to them, and are a
universal endowment of the mind of man. They consist
in certain innate ideas (KOLVO.I eWoicu) of moral qualities,
good and bad, becoming and unbecoming, fair and foul,