Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself - College of Stoic Philosophers

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself - College of Stoic Philosophers Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself - College of Stoic Philosophers

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Ixx INTRODUCTION SECT. functions of the physical organisms, are ' parts ' movements of the same life-force. and Stoic psychology does not base itself on study and observation of psychical processes, so much as on de- termined vindication of the supremacy of the Hegemonic power or will. The unity and the ascendancy of the Hegemonicon was held to exclude any psychology such as the Platonic, which accorded distinct and separable status to the rational and the irrational nature, to Reason, Passion, and Desire. The Stoic declined to recognise rival and independent powers, and regarded the emotional or sensuous, as well as the rational and intellectual, ' activities as parts of the soul.' Physically, they are conceived as currents of the one life-giving Pneuma, acting by different channels upon centres of consciousness, placed in the heart, or by some teachers in the brain. In this way they are incorporated in the one soul-energy, and placed absolutely at the disposition of the directive power. They are set in motion by external stimuli, but in their realisation as physical or psychical activities (trdOr), oppat, d/ae^ets) they are actual affections, functions, and 'parts' of the soul itself, and their subordination to the intellectual or reasoning faculty depends upon the fact that their action and indeed existence rests upon 'judgments,' favourable or adverse, and that the supreme judgment-forming power, man's guarantee of freedom, is vested in the reason, and is able to ignore and override the dictates or the protests of emotion, sensibility, or passion. In the case of the animals l we see impulse and instinct, unprovided 1 iii. 16; vi. 16 ; vii. 55.

in 3 STOIC DOGMA Ixxi with the superior check which puts man on a higher plane. In man, impulses and affections are not of necessity irrational ; on this point the language of Chrysippus and others is unmistakable. Strictly speak- ing, they are in themselves non-rational, but capable of adoption by the reason, and so of becoming rationalised. But there is a constant tendency among the zealots and rhetoricians of the school to press the verbal antithesis, to decry all forms of emotion as aber- rations from right reason, and to exact from the Wise Man their entire eradication. The question is at bottom one of terms. It is possible to confine the terms emotion, desire, and the like to those unauthorised affections and impulses, which are not incorporated by the directive power and so raised into constituent parts of virtue or right reason. On that understanding the doctrine of Apathy (d-jrdOeia) may be pressed without reserve, and the emotions treated as suspects or detected criminals ; but the restriction is arbitrary and misleading, as at variance with psychological fact. The emotions and affections do not change their nature in receiving sanction and adoption from the reason and the will ; and Stoicism lost much in moral efficacy by obscuring and even denying this psychological fact, and extending its disapproval of irrational (or unrationalised) emotions into a wholesale and undiscriminating ban. Sensation is treated on the same lines ; the five senses, often grouped as a single faculty of soul, are thought of as outlying feelers, so to speak, of the Pneuma, directed from the centre to the surface of the body, and maintaining communication between the conscious

Ixx INTRODUCTION SECT.<br />

functions <strong>of</strong> the physical organisms, are '<br />

parts '<br />

movements <strong>of</strong> the same life-force.<br />

and<br />

S<strong>to</strong>ic psychology does not base itself on study and<br />

observation <strong>of</strong> psychical processes, so much as on de-<br />

termined vindication <strong>of</strong> the supremacy <strong>of</strong> the Hegemonic<br />

power or will. The unity and the ascendancy <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Hegemonicon was held <strong>to</strong> exclude any psychology such<br />

as the Pla<strong>to</strong>nic, which accorded distinct and separable<br />

status <strong>to</strong> the rational and the irrational nature, <strong>to</strong><br />

Reason, Passion, and Desire. The S<strong>to</strong>ic declined <strong>to</strong><br />

recognise rival and independent powers, and regarded<br />

the emotional or sensuous, as well as the rational and<br />

intellectual,<br />

'<br />

activities as parts <strong>of</strong> the soul.' Physically,<br />

they are conceived as currents <strong>of</strong> the one life-giving<br />

Pneuma, acting by different channels upon centres <strong>of</strong><br />

consciousness, placed in the heart, or by some teachers<br />

in the brain. In this way they are incorporated in the<br />

one soul-energy, and placed absolutely at the disposition<br />

<strong>of</strong> the directive power. They are set in motion by<br />

external stimuli, but in their realisation as physical or<br />

psychical activities (trdOr), oppat, d/ae^ets) they are actual<br />

affections, functions, and 'parts' <strong>of</strong> the soul itself,<br />

and their subordination <strong>to</strong> the intellectual or reasoning<br />

faculty depends upon the fact that their action and<br />

indeed existence rests upon 'judgments,' favourable or<br />

adverse, and that the supreme judgment-forming power,<br />

man's guarantee <strong>of</strong> freedom, is vested in the reason,<br />

and is able <strong>to</strong> ignore and override the dictates or the<br />

protests <strong>of</strong> emotion, sensibility, or passion. In the case<br />

<strong>of</strong> the animals l we see impulse and instinct, unprovided<br />

1 iii. 16; vi. 16 ; vii. 55.

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