Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself - College of Stoic Philosophers
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself - College of Stoic Philosophers Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself - College of Stoic Philosophers
xxxiv INTRODUCTION SECT. injunction, Know thyself, and in the formulas, Virtue is knowledge Virtue may be taught 1 No one wilfully goes wrong 11 Virtue results in happiness; and all these maxims are first principles of Stoic dogma. In respect of all, Stoicism at least in its later exponents adheres more closely to the Socratic tradition than any other school ; and, alike in temper and interest, Epictetus re- produces the teaching of the master more faithfully than any of his disciples or more immediate successors. The power of the Socratic conclusions lay in affirm- ing the ultimate harmony of morality with reason, and in vindicating for the results of reason real and authori- tative validity. Man's moral sense, the existence of which is irrefragable, demands and certifies the reality of knowledge. The weakness of the affirmations, regarded as a system of ethics, apart from the confusion of will with knowledge, lay in defective and confused analysis of the contents of 'goodness.' To give positive meaning and efficacy to the dictum, * Virtue is knowledge,' it was indispensable to define with some precision the subject-matter of the knowledge meant. To explain it as ' knowledge of the good ' mere tautology, until the contents of * goodness ' enumerated or defined. According reduced it to were as the idea of pleasure or advantage or prosperity was permitted to preponderate, the maxim could be turned to Hedonistic, Utilitarian, or Eudsemonistic inferences, so that by variety of emphasis broadly contrasted types of ethical 1 Cf. vi. 27 ; viii. 59 ; ix. 11 ; x. 4 ; xi. 18 (9). 2 ii. I ; iv. 3 ; vii. 22, 62, 63 ; viii. 14 ; x. 30 ; xi. 18 (3) ; xii. 12.
ii i BIRTH OF STOICISM xxxv theory could found themselves upon the language and authority of Socrates. In affirming that Virtue was Knowledge, Socrates proceeded to enlarge the scope of Virtue or Excellence (aperr/) to the full range of general conceptions, and in the hands of his greatest disciple it rapidly expanded into a well-proportioned harmony of intellect, emotion, and will. But the Cynics, accepting the formula, pro- ceeded in an opposite direction, and instead of enlargiag their idea of Virtue to co-extension with the range of thought, they contracted the sphere of Knowledge to the area of individual activities. Associating knowledge exclusively with practical action and decision, Antisthenes tried to exclude from consideration everything except the problem of personal will effectuating itself in action. Openly scouting Platonic Idealism, and denying moral or logical value to general conceptions, he tried to satisfy the intellectual demand with the barest Nominalism, and even to restrict logic to mere identity of predication. In Physics the harshest ma- terialism, in Ethics the narrowest individualism, were the natural consequents (or perhaps antecedents) of his position. The sole concern of the philosopher became correct adjustment of the individual reason in the practical conduct of life ; and even this reduced morality confined itself within a narrow range of self-regarding virtues. Inasmuch as virtue was an act of will, within the individual control, all wants or desires, whether from within or from without, that lay outside the realisation of the will, were contradictions of virtue which the wise man would not tolerate. Here too an act of will was
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ii i BIRTH OF STOICISM xxxv<br />
theory could found themselves upon the language and<br />
authority <strong>of</strong> Socrates.<br />
In affirming that Virtue was Knowledge, Socrates<br />
proceeded <strong>to</strong> enlarge the scope <strong>of</strong> Virtue or Excellence<br />
(aperr/) <strong>to</strong> the full range <strong>of</strong> general conceptions, and in<br />
the hands <strong>of</strong> his greatest disciple it rapidly expanded<br />
in<strong>to</strong> a well-proportioned harmony <strong>of</strong> intellect, emotion,<br />
and will. But the Cynics, accepting the formula, pro-<br />
ceeded in an opposite direction, and instead <strong>of</strong> enlargiag<br />
their idea <strong>of</strong> Virtue <strong>to</strong> co-extension with the range <strong>of</strong><br />
thought, they contracted the sphere <strong>of</strong> Knowledge <strong>to</strong> the<br />
area <strong>of</strong> individual activities. Associating knowledge<br />
exclusively with practical action and decision, Antisthenes<br />
tried <strong>to</strong> exclude from consideration everything<br />
except the problem <strong>of</strong> personal will effectuating itself<br />
in action. Openly scouting Pla<strong>to</strong>nic Idealism, and<br />
denying moral or logical value <strong>to</strong> general conceptions,<br />
he tried <strong>to</strong> satisfy the intellectual demand with the<br />
barest Nominalism, and even <strong>to</strong> restrict logic <strong>to</strong> mere<br />
identity <strong>of</strong> predication. In Physics the harshest ma-<br />
terialism, in Ethics the narrowest individualism, were<br />
the natural consequents (or perhaps antecedents) <strong>of</strong> his<br />
position. The sole concern <strong>of</strong> the philosopher became<br />
correct adjustment <strong>of</strong> the individual reason in the<br />
practical conduct <strong>of</strong> life ;<br />
and even this reduced morality<br />
confined itself within a narrow range <strong>of</strong> self-regarding<br />
virtues. Inasmuch as virtue was an act <strong>of</strong> will, within<br />
the individual control, all wants or desires, whether from<br />
within or from without, that lay outside the realisation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the will, were contradictions <strong>of</strong> virtue which the wise<br />
man would not <strong>to</strong>lerate. Here <strong>to</strong>o an act <strong>of</strong> will was