Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself - College of Stoic Philosophers

cxl INTRODUCTION SECT.
individualistic morality. Stoicism insisted from the
first on the inwardness of virtue, and placed morality
in disposition and motive, not in obedience to prescribed
canons of action. As long as the gaze turned inward,
and mere self-consistency satisfied the demand of con-
formity to nature, pride and self-centred egoism were
the natural and almost inevitable outcome. But the
acceptance of a cosmic standard of reference, while
leaving the stress on motive and disposition unimpaired,
safeguards against selfish and self-satisfied contraction of
view. Excess of individualism, eccentricity of thought
or behaviour, is checked instead of encouraged; and
the moral pedantry of a Brutus or even a Helvidius, or
the aggressive spleen of a Juvenal or Persius, become as
alien to the temper of Marcus, as the tasteless vagaries
of a Diogenes. Alongside of modesty, forbearance,
and all that makes up *
temperance '
a liberal enlargement
is given to the active emotions, which right reason
can approve and authorise. Patience may extend to
*
pity ;
pride and indifference give way to meekness and
unselfish concern for others ; virtue may find delights
in offices of good ; and all the more temperate forms of
love kindness, charity, goodwill, and such like come
into free play. 2 But one restriction remains. The
quality of love is various, and Greek discriminates
where English is ambiguous. The forms in which this
sympathy for man is set forth, are devoid of emotion ;
if the term of passion ever escapes the sage's lips, it is
1
ii. 13 vii. 26.
;
2 The stress laid on the virtues here mentioned is reiterated.
For virtue as delight, see refs. p. cxxxi. note.