The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ...
The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ... The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ...
conference contain numerous, flagrant instances of partisan treatment. Such as one general of the Entente not recognizing the November 3, 1918 Padua truce agreement signed by another Entente general, Armando, Diaz. Or some foreign ministers vetoing their prime minister’s suggestions, see later the case of David Lloyd George. Some Hungarian historians see the existence of the Hungarian Soviet Republic as playing a key role in the annexation of Western Hungary. This does not stand up to scrutiny because, as we have already stated, this territory was given as compensation to Austria for South Tyrol, annexed to Italy. In this decision, a key role was played by President Wilson, who supported Austria, in opposition to the French, in its unrestrained and odious claims against Hungary. The Hungarian memoranda handed to the peace conference, especially the French-language speech of Albert Apponyi (and its English and Italian summary) did not go totally without effect. Italian PM Nitti and British PM Lloyd George suggested at the Supreme Council meeting of February 25, and again on March 3, that the question of Hungary’s borders be sent back for reconsideration, based on available materials and “without bias.” The British PM, citing relatively accurate numbers, pointed out that the peace agreement will place 2,750,000 Hungarians, meaning “a third of the Hungarian population,” under foreign rule, which “will not be easy to defend.” (The reality was closer to 3,500,000, most of whom lived immediately alongside the newly drawn borders, now in a foreign country, and what was (or used to be) an integral part of the Hungarian ethnic bloc.) There will be no peace in Europe, Lloyd George predicted, “if later it becomes known that Hungary’s claims are justified and entire Hungarian communities were given to Czechoslovakia or Transylvania [sic! meaning Romania—J.B.] like a herd of cattle, just because the conference refused to discuss the Hungarian issue.” 209 Subsequently, a French language memorandum was prepared, which was discovered among the papers of Vittorio Cerruti, the chief Italian representative in Budapest. The author suggested plebiscites in some of the Hungarianpopulated areas earmarked for annexation, including Western Hungary. “The dismemberment of Hungary will happen – reads one of the documents – without taking into the least consideration the will of the affected people. They are herded from one country into another like reluctant flocks in a barn.” It then continued: “More than half of these people are Hungarian or German and nothing entitles us to the conclusion that the other half totally wishes to separate from its old country.” And finally, a conclusion: “Only a plebiscite would be able to conclusively determine the will of the population, and it seems impossible for us to deem this demand as a quantié négligeable (negligible 209 Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. Ed. by P. T. Bury & R. Butler. First Series. Vol. VII. London, 1958, pp. 384-388. Cited by Romsics, Ignác: Magyarország története a 20. században [Hungarian history in the 20 th century]. Budapest, 1999, p. 140. 88
amount).” 210 French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Alexandre Millerand rejected the reexamination of the Hungarian borders. Yet, the Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers meeting in London on March 8, 1920 returned to the question of Hungary’s borders. In the discussions, the Italians suggested investigation of the Hungarians’ counter-arguments, while the French deemed reconsideration as superfluous and out-of-date. The British diplomats – among them Foreign Minister George Curzon – tipped the scales by not lining up behind their own prime minister, Lloyd George, but behind the French position. In Curzon’s proposal, they finally reached a symbolic agreement: the reopening of the Hungarian border question was rejected before the signing of the peace treaty but made it possible for the border settlement committees to make suggestions for minor alterations if local visits to certain sectors find actual unfairness. It was also decided here that the possibility of later modifications would not be included in the text of the peace treaty but would be made known to the Hungarians through a separate accompanying letter. This became the so-called lettre d’envoi of Millerand, which was later attached to the Trianon decree. The attached letter was, thus, not of French but of British origin but signed by the French President as president of the Peace Conference. 211 It was also he who handed the final text of the Trianon Treaty to the Hungarian delegation on May 6, 1920. The so-called Millerand letter 212 affixed that: Hungary’s wishes could not be taken into consideration but – as it soon became cynically evident – that the League of Nations would ‘discuss’ minor border adjustment requests. But only, naturally, if the determined border “perhaps does is not completely adequate for the ethnographic or economic requirements.” The failings will be remedied by the border committees. The Supreme Council sent its reply to the comments of the Hungarian peace delegation on May 20, 1920, along with the final text of the peace treaty. The Entente Powers deemed as irrelevant the Hungarian suggestions regarding territorial solutions and plebiscites. The border adjustment promises of the Entente Powers remained just that, high-sounding promises, because the Council of Ambassadors sent secret instructions to the border adjustment committees on July 22, 1920 to ignore the Millerand letter and to post the borders according to the terms of the peace treaty. In the meanwhile, the letter raised unfounded optimism in official Hungarian circles, which was further fed by the non-ratification of the peace treaties by the United States, although for reasons independent of the Hungarian question, and even signing a separate peace with Hungary on August 29, 1921. 210 Archivio Storico [Roma], AP, B. 1740 (Ungheria), Cerruti, Feb. 3, 1920. Cited by Ormos, 1990. op. cit., p. 43. 211 Romsics, 1999, op. cit., p. 141. 212 A magyar béketárgyalások. II. köt. 479–480. old. 89
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amount).” 210<br />
French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Alexandre Millerand rejected<br />
the reexamination <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian borders. Yet, the Ambassadors and Foreign<br />
Ministers meeting in London on March 8, 1920 returned to the question <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Hungary</strong>’s borders. In the discussions, the Italians suggested investigation <strong>of</strong><br />
the Hungarians’ counter-arguments, while the French deemed reconsideration<br />
as superfluous and out-<strong>of</strong>-date. <strong>The</strong> British diplomats – among them Foreign<br />
Minister George Curzon – tipped the scales by not lining up behind their own<br />
prime minister, Lloyd George, but behind the French position. In Curzon’s<br />
proposal, they finally reached a symbolic agreement: the reopening <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Hungarian border question was rejected before the signing <strong>of</strong> the peace treaty<br />
but made it possible for the border settlement committees to make suggestions<br />
for minor alterations if local visits to certain sectors find actual unfairness. It<br />
was also decided here that the possibility <strong>of</strong> later modifications would not be<br />
included in the text <strong>of</strong> the peace treaty but would be made known to the<br />
Hungarians through a separate accompanying letter. This became the so-called<br />
lettre d’envoi <strong>of</strong> Millerand, which was later attached to the Trianon decree. <strong>The</strong><br />
attached letter was, thus, not <strong>of</strong> French but <strong>of</strong> British origin but signed by the<br />
French President as president <strong>of</strong> the Peace Conference. 211 It was also he who<br />
handed the final text <strong>of</strong> the Trianon Treaty to the Hungarian delegation on May<br />
6, 1920.<br />
<strong>The</strong> so-called Millerand letter 212 affixed that: <strong>Hungary</strong>’s wishes could not be<br />
taken into consideration but – as it soon became cynically evident – that the<br />
League <strong>of</strong> Nations would ‘discuss’ minor border adjustment requests. But only,<br />
naturally, if the determined border “perhaps does is not completely adequate for<br />
the ethnographic or economic requirements.” <strong>The</strong> failings will be remedied by<br />
the border committees. <strong>The</strong> Supreme Council sent its reply to the comments <strong>of</strong><br />
the Hungarian peace delegation on May 20, 1920, along with the final text <strong>of</strong><br />
the peace treaty. <strong>The</strong> Entente Powers deemed as irrelevant the Hungarian<br />
suggestions regarding territorial solutions and plebiscites.<br />
<strong>The</strong> border adjustment promises <strong>of</strong> the Entente Powers remained just that,<br />
high-sounding promises, because the Council <strong>of</strong> Ambassadors sent secret<br />
instructions to the border adjustment committees on July 22, 1920 to ignore the<br />
Millerand letter and to post the borders according to the terms <strong>of</strong> the peace<br />
treaty. In the meanwhile, the letter raised unfounded optimism in <strong>of</strong>ficial<br />
Hungarian circles, which was further fed by the non-ratification <strong>of</strong> the peace<br />
treaties by the United States, although for reasons independent <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian<br />
question, and even signing a separate peace with <strong>Hungary</strong> on August 29, <strong>1921</strong>.<br />
210<br />
Archivio Storico [Roma], AP, B. 1740 (Ungheria), Cerruti, Feb. 3, 1920. Cited by<br />
Ormos, 1990. op. cit., p. 43.<br />
211<br />
Romsics, 1999, op. cit., p. 141.<br />
212<br />
A magyar béketárgyalások. II. köt. 479–480. old.<br />
89