The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ...

conference contain numerous, flagrant instances of partisan treatment. Such as
one general of the Entente not recognizing the November 3, 1918 Padua truce
agreement signed by another Entente general, Armando, Diaz. Or some foreign
ministers vetoing their prime minister’s suggestions, see later the case of David
Lloyd George. Some Hungarian historians see the existence of the Hungarian
Soviet Republic as playing a key role in the annexation of Western Hungary.
This does not stand up to scrutiny because, as we have already stated, this
territory was given as compensation to Austria for South Tyrol, annexed to
Italy. In this decision, a key role was played by President Wilson, who
supported Austria, in opposition to the French, in its unrestrained and odious
claims against Hungary.
The Hungarian memoranda handed to the peace conference, especially the
French-language speech of Albert Apponyi (and its English and Italian
summary) did not go totally without effect. Italian PM Nitti and British PM
Lloyd George suggested at the Supreme Council meeting of February 25, and
again on March 3, that the question of Hungary’s borders be sent back for
reconsideration, based on available materials and “without bias.” The British
PM, citing relatively accurate numbers, pointed out that the peace agreement
will place 2,750,000 Hungarians, meaning “a third of the Hungarian
population,” under foreign rule, which “will not be easy to defend.” (The reality
was closer to 3,500,000, most of whom lived immediately alongside the newly
drawn borders, now in a foreign country, and what was (or used to be) an
integral part of the Hungarian ethnic bloc.) There will be no peace in Europe,
Lloyd George predicted, “if later it becomes known that Hungary’s claims are
justified and entire Hungarian communities were given to Czechoslovakia or
Transylvania [sic! meaning Romania—J.B.] like a herd of cattle, just because
the conference refused to discuss the Hungarian issue.” 209
Subsequently, a French language memorandum was prepared, which was
discovered among the papers of Vittorio Cerruti, the chief Italian representative
in Budapest. The author suggested plebiscites in some of the Hungarianpopulated
areas earmarked for annexation, including Western Hungary. “The
dismemberment of Hungary will happen – reads one of the documents –
without taking into the least consideration the will of the affected people. They
are herded from one country into another like reluctant flocks in a barn.” It then
continued: “More than half of these people are Hungarian or German and
nothing entitles us to the conclusion that the other half totally wishes to
separate from its old country.” And finally, a conclusion: “Only a plebiscite
would be able to conclusively determine the will of the population, and it seems
impossible for us to deem this demand as a quantié négligeable (negligible
209 Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. Ed. by P. T. Bury & R. Butler.
First Series. Vol. VII. London, 1958, pp. 384-388. Cited by Romsics, Ignác:
Magyarország története a 20. században [Hungarian history in the 20 th century].
Budapest, 1999, p. 140.
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