The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ...
The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ... The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ...
Based on the Czechoslovak’s demands and the Beneš memorandum, the representatives of the Kingdom of Serbs-Croats-Slovenes immediately joined with the Western Hungary Slav corridor plan and without delay came forward with new territorial demands. Their plan would have seen the establishment of the corridor running through Trans-Danubia from the town of Baja, North of Pécs in a western direction to the southwestern corner of Lake Balaton, following the course of the Zala and Rába Rivers, to end at Lake Fertő. The hastily composed demand of the Belgrade government would have encompassed two-thirds of the Hungarian populated counties of Somogy and Zala, the eastern part of Vas County and even the eastern third of Sopron County. This additional new claim of approx. 7,000 km 2 brought Serbian claims of Hungarian territory to a total of 52,065 km 2 . (approx. 1.25 million acres). These unrealistic claims could only be justified by astonishing feats of logic. The South Slav Kingdom always preferred to use two: spreading of fictitious data and military power. Under this plan, Czechoslovakia would have received all of Moson County and the western portions of Sopron and Vas counties. On top of it all, the Serb military command demanded in a February 10 note the permanent annexation of the already occupied city of Pécs and its surrounding coalfields. Satisfying the new territorial claim would have meant that the entirety of the southern Trans-Danubia, including the Mecsek Mountains, and even a part of western Trans-Danubia, would have been attached to the Kingdom of Serbs-Croats-Slovenes. Subsequently, a new Belgrade plan was formulated, this one far more modest in its demands. According to this one, the Hungarian territory to come under South Slav control would lie South of the Barcs–Nagykanizsa– Szentgotthárd line. North of this line and West of a straight line from Nagykanizsa to Győr would have become a part of Czechoslovakia. In the meantime, at the end of February, the Czech-Slovak representatives presented their final plan concerning the Slav corridor to the Peace Conference, which, naturally enough, was supported by the South Slav delegates. Compared to the plan presented during the war, the then 150-200 km. wide Western Hungary corridor had now shrunk to about 100km. with its eastern boundary now running between Magyaróvár to Nagykanizsa. This demand was based not on ethic principles but historical (claiming the area was Slav populated before the Hungarian conquest) and strategic ones (separating the Hungarians and Germans). None of the Entente representatives were in support of the plan. In the end, the proposed Slav corridor failed to materialize because the British authorities were sharply against annexing the Vend/Slovene populated area between Szentgotthárd and the Mura River to the South Slav state. Leaving this area with Hungary was beneficial for Hungary because it indirectly rejected the territorial claims of Czechoslovakia and the Serb-Croat- Slovene Kingdom against Western Hungary. Subsequently, the appropriate 1914], pp. 74, 77. 44
committee of the Peace Conference unanimously rejected, without any vocal debate, the Czechoslovak proposal regarding the Slav corridor on March 8. Thus, the Prague and Belgrade governments were unable to establish direct contact between their two countries 102 via the so-called Slav corridor, and Czechoslovakia also did not secure an outlet to the Adriatic Sea. After long negotiations, the Belgrade government finally gave up its claim to the Rába and Zala River area but, as part of the Trianon treaty agreement, it received, in exchange, the valley of the Lendva River, today’s Međimurje (Muravidék). As well, it was given the area South of the Mura and Rába Rivers, the southern part of the Vend region. We will treat the final Hungarian-South Slav border in greater detail in the next chapter. Whose interests would the annexation of the western Hungarian Borderland serve? Consider that it was part of the country for a thousand years and to which it had always been loyally devoted. “Not the West Hungarians, not German-Austria – beset as it was by enemies – but solely in the interest of the Czech and Serb imperialists, as well as the Greater Germany faction in Austria. Initially, the voracious Czech and Serb predators wanted to claim this valuable territory for themselves, to create a corridor between northern and southern Slavs. Then, when this seemed an impossibility due to the heated opposition of Italy, they had the servile French friends arrange to annex it to Austria, obviously with the clever aim of driving a wedge between two countries thrown on each other, Austria and Hungary. (…) In the calculations of the Pan-German Austrians, Western Hungary obviously had another role. They saw it as an acein-the-hole in a European-level movement begun with the intention of uniting Austria to the German empire – a movement going ahead towards its own goal, without regard to any casualties.” 103 The new Austria-Hungary border, defined later in the Treaty of Trianon, cannot be separated from the Treaty of Saint-Germain signed by Austria on September 10, 1919, from France’s Central European policies (or attempts at influence) and the American delegates’ pro-Austrian behavior. During the Paris conference, the consideration of the Austria question underwent significant change after the Entente Powers decided against the union of Austria with Germany. Thus, they began to search for a possibility of Austrian independence, a shift that Vienna quickly realized. In the meantime, Anschluss faded by degrees into the background – seen by the French as Germanization – and the idea of an autonomous and independent Austria gained ground. One of the main reasons was that – although German-Austria signed an agreement with Germany of the terms of a union in February 1919 – Berlin could less and less 102 Romsics, 2001, op.cit., pp. 124–125. 103 Ajtay, József: Külpolitikai helyzet – Nyugat-Magyarország [Foreign policy situation in Western Hungary]. In: Új Magyar Szemle, year II, vol. II, issue 3, June, p. 359; also Romsics, Ignác: Szláv korridor, Burgenland, Lajtabánság: koncepciók Nyugat- Magyarországról [Slav corridor, Burgenland, Lajta-Banat: models of Western Hungary]. In: Regio, 1992, issue 1, pp. 90–99. 45
- Page 1 and 2: The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-19
- Page 3 and 4: CONTENTS Foreword………………
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committee <strong>of</strong> the Peace Conference unanimously rejected, without any vocal<br />
debate, the Czechoslovak proposal regarding the Slav corridor on March 8.<br />
Thus, the Prague and Belgrade governments were unable to establish direct<br />
contact between their two countries 102 via the so-called Slav corridor, and<br />
Czechoslovakia also did not secure an outlet to the Adriatic Sea.<br />
After long negotiations, the Belgrade government finally gave up its claim<br />
to the Rába and Zala River area but, as part <strong>of</strong> the Trianon treaty agreement, it<br />
received, in exchange, the valley <strong>of</strong> the Lendva River, today’s Međimurje<br />
(Muravidék). As well, it was given the area South <strong>of</strong> the Mura and Rába Rivers,<br />
the southern part <strong>of</strong> the Vend region. We will treat the final Hungarian-South<br />
Slav border in greater detail in the next chapter.<br />
Whose interests would the annexation <strong>of</strong> the western Hungarian Borderland<br />
serve? Consider that it was part <strong>of</strong> the country for a thousand years and to<br />
which it had always been loyally devoted. “Not the West Hungarians, not<br />
German-Austria – beset as it was by enemies – but solely in the interest <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Czech and Serb imperialists, as well as the Greater Germany faction in Austria.<br />
Initially, the voracious Czech and Serb predators wanted to claim this valuable<br />
territory for themselves, to create a corridor between northern and southern<br />
Slavs. <strong>The</strong>n, when this seemed an impossibility due to the heated opposition <strong>of</strong><br />
Italy, they had the servile French friends arrange to annex it to Austria,<br />
obviously with the clever aim <strong>of</strong> driving a wedge between two countries thrown<br />
on each other, Austria and <strong>Hungary</strong>. (…) In the calculations <strong>of</strong> the Pan-German<br />
Austrians, <strong>Western</strong> <strong>Hungary</strong> obviously had another role. <strong>The</strong>y saw it as an acein-the-hole<br />
in a European-level movement begun with the intention <strong>of</strong> uniting<br />
Austria to the German empire – a movement going ahead towards its own goal,<br />
without regard to any casualties.” 103<br />
<strong>The</strong> new Austria-<strong>Hungary</strong> border, defined later in the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Trianon,<br />
cannot be separated from the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Saint-Germain signed by Austria on<br />
September 10, 1919, from France’s Central European policies (or attempts at<br />
influence) and the American delegates’ pro-Austrian behavior. During the Paris<br />
conference, the consideration <strong>of</strong> the Austria question underwent significant<br />
change after the Entente Powers decided against the union <strong>of</strong> Austria with<br />
Germany. Thus, they began to search for a possibility <strong>of</strong> Austrian<br />
independence, a shift that Vienna quickly realized. In the meantime, Anschluss<br />
faded by degrees into the background – seen by the French as Germanization –<br />
and the idea <strong>of</strong> an autonomous and independent Austria gained ground. One <strong>of</strong><br />
the main reasons was that – although German-Austria signed an agreement with<br />
Germany <strong>of</strong> the terms <strong>of</strong> a union in February 1919 – Berlin could less and less<br />
102 Romsics, 2001, op.cit., pp. 124–125.<br />
103 Ajtay, József: Külpolitikai helyzet – Nyugat-Magyarország [Foreign policy situation<br />
in <strong>Western</strong> <strong>Hungary</strong>]. In: Új Magyar Szemle, year II, vol. II, issue 3, June, p. 359; also<br />
Romsics, Ignác: Szláv korridor, Burgenland, Lajtabánság: koncepciók Nyugat-<br />
Magyarországról [Slav corridor, Burgenland, Lajta-Banat: models <strong>of</strong> <strong>Western</strong><br />
<strong>Hungary</strong>]. In: Regio, 1992, issue 1, pp. 90–99.<br />
45