The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ...
The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ... The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ...
undertake to evacuate zone ‘A’ (…) or there will not be an agreement, but then we will not do a special favor for Austria. (…) If we cannot reach an agreement and are forced to march out of zone ‘B’ due to compelling circumstances, the proclamation of independent Burgenland is a matter of the local population and the rebels, in which we cannot even get involved. Thus, the Hungarian government cannot officially consider this matter.” 394 During the following days, the attempts of Robert Davy, governor of the province of Burgenland, to relocate his offices to Sopron raised the interest of the Hungarian government and public opinion. In all likelihood, the aim was to underline that Austria has not given up its claim to the city. In his noon report on September 15, Lt.Gen. Hegedűs informed that Chancellor Schober’s request regarding this matter was read to him by the Entente generals when he was conferring with them. The Vienna government asked for assurances that Davy “would not receive any abuse from the Sopron population” and he promised to look after his security. He could not, however, assure that “he would not be verbally insulted on the street.” The matter of the Austrian governor was also touched upon in the September 17 report sent by Villani. The Entente’s reply to the Hungarian memorandum announcing his arrival was: “Until Davy is in Sopron, Hungarian liaison officers cannot be in zone ‘A’ with the Entente sub-missions. This reply of the generals is without logic because, in my opinion, you cannot construct a link between Davy’s whereabouts and the assignment of the Hungarian liaison officers. Especially since the generals’ committee requested it at the time. The recall of the liaison officers has already been ordered. Their task, which we informed the generals’ committee beforehand, they were naturally enough unable to complete, despite their best efforts.” 395 The situation was further complicated by the continued push of the Austrian government of the Davy matter. Foreign ministerial adviser Villani reported from Sopron at 11:00 on September 18 that the Entente generals had sent a telegram to the Council of Ambassadors in Paris. In it they asked that the council take action that Davy, as representative of the Austrian government, can stay in Sopron permanently and the guarantee of his personal safety be the responsibility of the Hungarian government. Regarding the potential Sopron activities of Davy, as Landesverwalter [provincial head, or chief-J.B.], forced Lt.Gen. Hegedűs to raise a objection with the generals, stating: “It is extremely difficult to guarantee his personal safety because the population connects him to the arbitrary actions and atrocities carried out by the Austrians. Namely: the dissolution of the village representative bodies, sacking the elected district and village civil servants, the taking and mistreatment of hostages. Since everybody here is convinced that Dr. Davy is responsible for these acts, the bitterness against him is so great that we would be able to protect his person from insults only if we always accompany him. With armed men or at least several secret 394 Ibid, pp. 502–503. 395 Ibid, pp. 518, 520, 543. 150
police bodyguards, which he might not find very pleasant, either.” Finally, Villani reported that he had a long conversation with Baron Stefan Neugebauer, ministerial advisor and ‘on very good terms’ with Chancellor Schober, – the content of which he will report to the Foreign Ministry – who was also working on removing Davy. Next he asked the prime minister’s approval to start a disinformation action against Davy, making use of his close contacts at several Viennese newspapers. They would evaluate the work of the provincial governor and demand his removal for Austria’s interest. PM Bethlen agreed to the anti- Davy steps “especially in the Austrian press. But if the generals were to allow him into Sopron, I ask caution, lest any physical violence or demonstrations be done against Davy that might be taken as disorderliness, to be able to be used against us.” 396 Earlier, Lt.Gen. Hegedűs reported in the evening of September 15: a delegation led by former mayor of Sopron, Károly Töpler, visited him and asked that Maj. Ostenburg and his battalion continue to remain in Sopron because the planned relocation of the unit “caused great agitation among the population.” The local police have received information that former prime minister István Friedrich, Pál Prónay and Iván Héjjas are once more in Sopron, “for which there is no need, and not particularly desirable.” Lt.Gen. Hegedűs suggested that, through Count Sigray, the government request them to leave the city. This had indeed happened because, according to the Commissioner’s daily reports – based on informants – Prónay was already in the vicinity of Felsőpulya on September 16 th and by the 18 th was in Felsőőr, in zone ‘A’. 397 Still on the same day, the 15 th , Col. Lehár showed up in Szombathely with the stated objective: to gather familiarity of the “mood” of the Western Hungary population. In reality, he arrived as the agent of the Hungarian government but who was arrested the following day by Prónay in the vicinity of Felsőőr and was only released four days later by the intercession of Count Sigray. 398 Prónay justified himself by saying that Lehár “is an Austrian spy” and he received orders for the arrest. 399 The Entente generals in Sopron were of the opinion that the colonel was arrested because he was a “Karlist,” meaning a follower of the former Habsburg ruler, Charles IV. Gyula Gömbös became embroiled in the solution of the Antal Lehár matter, as the following telegram shows: “The arrested former colonel, if he gives his word of honor never to enter into the district, is to be escorted to zone ‘A’ and released without any harm. (Signed) Jákfai.” 400 Col. Köller, Chief-of-Staff of Lt.Gen. Hegedűs, sent the following telegram on the following day, September 16: “The situation is 396 Ibid, pp. 549–552. 397 Ibid, pp. 523, 525, 555, 558. 398 Zsiga, 1988, op. cit., p. 126. 399 Fogarassy, László: Lehár ezredes a Prónay-felkelők fogságában [Col. Lehár in the captivity of the Prónay rebels]. In: Soproni Szemle, 1975, issue 4, pp. 348–351. 400 MOL. K 26. 1388. csomó. 1922–„H” tétel, pp. 548, 553–554. Gyula Gömbös used the alias ‘Jákfai’ in this period, after his family’s estate in Jákfa. 151
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undertake to evacuate zone ‘A’ (…) or there will not be an agreement, but then<br />
we will not do a special favor for Austria. (…) If we cannot reach an agreement<br />
and are forced to march out <strong>of</strong> zone ‘B’ due to compelling circumstances, the<br />
proclamation <strong>of</strong> independent Burgenland is a matter <strong>of</strong> the local population and<br />
the rebels, in which we cannot even get involved. Thus, the Hungarian<br />
government cannot <strong>of</strong>ficially consider this matter.” 394<br />
During the following days, the attempts <strong>of</strong> Robert Davy, governor <strong>of</strong> the<br />
province <strong>of</strong> Burgenland, to relocate his <strong>of</strong>fices to Sopron raised the interest <strong>of</strong><br />
the Hungarian government and public opinion. In all likelihood, the aim was to<br />
underline that Austria has not given up its claim to the city.<br />
In his noon report on September 15, Lt.Gen. Hegedűs informed that<br />
Chancellor Schober’s request regarding this matter was read to him by the<br />
Entente generals when he was conferring with them. <strong>The</strong> Vienna government<br />
asked for assurances that Davy “would not receive any abuse from the Sopron<br />
population” and he promised to look after his security. He could not, however,<br />
assure that “he would not be verbally insulted on the street.”<br />
<strong>The</strong> matter <strong>of</strong> the Austrian governor was also touched upon in the<br />
September 17 report sent by Villani. <strong>The</strong> Entente’s reply to the Hungarian<br />
memorandum announcing his arrival was: “Until Davy is in Sopron, Hungarian<br />
liaison <strong>of</strong>ficers cannot be in zone ‘A’ with the Entente sub-missions. This reply<br />
<strong>of</strong> the generals is without logic because, in my opinion, you cannot construct a<br />
link between Davy’s whereabouts and the assignment <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian liaison<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers. Especially since the generals’ committee requested it at the time. <strong>The</strong><br />
recall <strong>of</strong> the liaison <strong>of</strong>ficers has already been ordered. <strong>The</strong>ir task, which we<br />
informed the generals’ committee beforehand, they were naturally enough<br />
unable to complete, despite their best efforts.” 395<br />
<strong>The</strong> situation was further complicated by the continued push <strong>of</strong> the Austrian<br />
government <strong>of</strong> the Davy matter. Foreign ministerial adviser Villani reported<br />
from Sopron at 11:00 on September 18 that the Entente generals had sent a<br />
telegram to the Council <strong>of</strong> Ambassadors in Paris. In it they asked that the<br />
council take action that Davy, as representative <strong>of</strong> the Austrian government, can<br />
stay in Sopron permanently and the guarantee <strong>of</strong> his personal safety be the<br />
responsibility <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian government. Regarding the potential Sopron<br />
activities <strong>of</strong> Davy, as Landesverwalter [provincial head, or chief-J.B.], forced<br />
Lt.Gen. Hegedűs to raise a objection with the generals, stating: “It is extremely<br />
difficult to guarantee his personal safety because the population connects him<br />
to the arbitrary actions and atrocities carried out by the Austrians. Namely: the<br />
dissolution <strong>of</strong> the village representative bodies, sacking the elected district and<br />
village civil servants, the taking and mistreatment <strong>of</strong> hostages. Since everybody<br />
here is convinced that Dr. Davy is responsible for these acts, the bitterness<br />
against him is so great that we would be able to protect his person from insults<br />
only if we always accompany him. With armed men or at least several secret<br />
394 Ibid, pp. 502–503.<br />
395 Ibid, pp. 518, 520, 543.<br />
150