The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ...

of President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points, made public by the U.S. president
on January 8, 1918. Burián’s suggestion was rejected in a response note, in the
name of the Entente Powers, by British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour on
September 16 th , by French Prime Minister Clemenceau on the 17 th , and by US
Secretary of State Robert Lansing on the 19 th .
Ten days later, on the 29 th , as a result of the Entente forces’ Balkan
offensive, Bulgaria sued for a cease fire. As a result, Germany and the
Monarchy were forced to face up to defeat. On the same day, the German
Imperial War Council decided to sue for truce and, taking into consideration the
Wilsonian 14 Points, to open peace talks. On October 4, at the same time as
Germany and Turkey, Foreign Minister Burián sent another note to Woodrow
Wilson on behalf of the Monarchy, proposing a truce and, based on Wilson’s
14 Points, the beginning of peace negotiations. 12 Wilson rejected the notes sent
by the Central Powers on October 8. Austrian Emperor and Hungarian King,
Charles, proclaimed the transformation of Austria into a federative state on
October 16 and directed the provinces to form their own National Councils.
This, however, did not extend to the countries under the Hungarian Holy Crown
(historical Hungary, including Transylvania, and the associated countries of
Croatia-Slavonia and the semi-autonomous territory of Fiume/Rijeka). Also, the
common ministries of foreign affairs, finance and war remained. Two days
later, on October 18, President Wilson wrote a reply to Foreign Minister
Burián’s second note in which he stated that the 14 Points did not form the
basis of talks with the Monarchy, having been born of different military and
political circumstances. 13 The answer to the American note came on October 27
from Count Gyula Andrássy (1860-1929), the new – and last – Foreign
Minister of the Monarchy – Burián having been, in the interim, replaced – in
which he accepted the Wilsonian settlement principles and the right of selfdetermination
of the Czech-Slovak and South Slav peoples. During these
weeks, the newspapers were full of the rabble-rousing and inflammatory
speeches of parliamentary representatives Mihály Károlyi, László Fényes 14
(1871-1944) and their ilk. Moreover, “the Italians threw thousands of leaflets
(into our trenches) containing the subversive parliamentary speeches of Count
Mihály Károlyi and friends, informing us before the arrival of the newspapers
to the front,” 15 wrote Colonel Ferenc Nyékhegyi, commander of the 9 th Infantry
12 Révai Mór, János: Magyarország integritása és a wilsoni elvek [Hungary’s territorial
integrity and the Wilsonian principles]. Magyarország Területi Épségének Védelmi
Ligája. Budapest, 1920, pp. 14–42.
13 For the documents of the texts of exchange of the so-called Burián notes, see addenda
in Rubint, Dezső: Az összeomlás [The collapse]. Budapest, 1922.
14 In 1918, László Fényes was Minister of State for War in the Károlyi government and
commissar for Defence, organizing the disarmament of Hungarian and Szekler troops in
Transylvania, which were self-organizing against a Romanian occupation.
15 Nyékhegyi, Ferenc: A Diaz-féle fegyverszüneti szerződés. (A páduai fegyverszünet)
[The Diaz ceasefire agreement. (The Padua ceasefire)]. Budapest, 1922, p. 54. Colonel
Ferenc Nyékhegyi describes it based on personal experiences and bona fide documents.
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