The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ...
The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ... The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1921 - Corvinus Library ...
detailed the duties and responsibilities of the assigned Entente officers. The secret instructions specified the distribution of the officers by districts and named the highest ranking or oldest as head. Under the supervision of the group of generals in Sopron, they had two main tasks to complete: supervise and control the handover process, with the cooperation of the Hungarian and Austrian officials sent to the scene. As well, thirdly, to prevent any abuses toward the population. They were to remedy any possible grievances in collaboration with the representatives of both Hungary and Austria. At the time of the handover, set for August 26-28, the Entente officers were expected to send reports every six hours to the generals of the Military Mission in Sopron. The gendarmerie, working alongside the local authorities, was asked to provide courier services. The Entente officers were empowered to requisition local cars and other means of transportation, typewriters, etc., over and above any resources provided to them. They were also to have free use of the railways, mail and telegraph services, and official and private telephones, day or night on a priority basis. 261 The Hungarian-Austrian negotiations continued in August. The first discussion at the highest level took place in Vienna on the 3 rd , attended by, among others, former Foreign Minister Gustav Gratz and Chancellor Schober. Here, they came to an agreement that about one-third of Western Hungary will remain as part of Hungary. The affected parts were: the part of Moson County stretching to Lake Fertő, Sopron County to Vulka Creek, the city of Sopron, as well as a strip of Vas County. The agreement was strongly supported by prelate Ignaz Seipel, the most influential member of the Christian-Socialist Party and later chancellor. Schober also stressed that this territorial agreement would have to be ratified by the Foreign Affairs committee of the Austrian parliament. 262 The committee, however, did not ratify the agreement at either its 13 th or 27 th meetings. In fact, it declared that any possible territorial concession will be contingent on the prior handing over of Burgenland. The committee was only willing to consider renouncing its claim to the almost entirely Hungarianpopulated village of Nagycenk because the body of the “greatest Hungarian,” Count István Széchenyi, was resting there in the family crypt. This, in spite of Foreign Minister Miklós Bánffy coming to terms with the handing over of the territory if Sopron and its surrounding area remain in Hungarian hands until the conclusion of the negotiations. 263 In the meantime, the Hungarian government submitted another territorial proposition in which it laid claim to Sopron, a portion of the Lake Fertő area and about a 5 km. wide strip of Vas County. It, however, made no offer of any 261 Mollay, Károly: A Szövetségközi Katonai Bizottság bizalmas utasítása a hozzá beosztott antanttisztekhez. 1921. augusztus 1 [Confidential instructions to the officers delegated to the Inter-Allied Military Mission. Aug. 21, 1921]. In: Soproni Szemle, 1991, issue 4, pp. 316–317; unabridged French-language instructions, pp. 317–319. 262 Fogarassy, 1971, op. cit., p. 302. 263 Fogarassy, 1982, op. cit., p. 16. 108
trade concessions. This was justified by reasoning that its original claims were already reduced to a quarter, while the Austrian leadership consistently rejected every one of its counter-proposals. The Hungarian government sought assurances in its final (August 18) proposal: 1. Austria agrees that the claimed areas – at least Sopron and its surroundings – remain a part of Hungary until the conclusion of the dialogue. 2. This fact to be conveyed to the Council of Ambassadors in Paris. 3. That public administration officials in the ceded area remain in their jobs. 264 The Hungarian government also stated that, in the matter of the affiliation of contested areas, as a final solution, it will agree to a decision by plebiscite, with the proviso that the affected areas do not first come under Austrian administration. If the Austrian government is not willing to accept this, then Hungary requested agreement primarily to the following issues: exchange of currency, assurance on tax arrears, settlement of the government’s debts and war bonds resulting from the war, as well as various guarantees for the Hungarian state assets in Western Hungary. The Bethlen government estimated that the common Austrian-Hungarian assets on the to-be-annexed territory ran to 3.971 billion Kroner. Of that, Hungary tried to tie the recovery of its proportion to the handover of Western Hungary, as well as the withdrawal of South Slav troops from southern Hungary. In fact, it stated that, if it was unable to come to an agreement with the Vienna government, Budapest would only cede Western Hungary if it was forced to do so by an ultimatum from the Entente. From the above negotiations, it can clearly be seen that the earlier Teleki government, and from the middle of April, 1921, the Bethlen government, strongly defended Western Hungary, and indeed generally Hungarian, interests to the last possible moment. We will later show numerous examples of it. The very fixed stance of the Bethlen government finally forced the Austrian Foreign Affairs committee to make concessions to Hungary’s demands at their August 27 session. The committee authorized the Vienna government, with the agreement of the signatories of the Saint-Germain treaty, to solve the border dispute one year after the handover of Western Hungary by the expressed wish of the people. Although they did not use the term ‘plebiscite,’ the Austrian decision was clearly a political victory for the Hungarian government. The giving up of the millennial western border region caused great mental anguish in the population remaining in a Hungary dismembered after the Trianon Peace Decree. Popular opinion was most upset by the fact that its ally and co-loser in the war, Austria, also grew in territory torn from Hungary. The events greatly influenced the population of Sopron, mainly German-speaking but of Hungarian-sentiment, who were especially dispirited and embittered on August 20, 1921 [Hungary’s national day-ed.]. This was the day that posters appeared all around the city whereby the Entente Mission announced the handover plan of Western Hungary. The time and date of the official handover 264 Soós, 1971, op. cit., pp. 132–133. 109
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detailed the duties and responsibilities <strong>of</strong> the assigned Entente <strong>of</strong>ficers. <strong>The</strong><br />
secret instructions specified the distribution <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>ficers by districts and<br />
named the highest ranking or oldest as head. Under the supervision <strong>of</strong> the group<br />
<strong>of</strong> generals in Sopron, they had two main tasks to complete: supervise and<br />
control the handover process, with the cooperation <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian and<br />
Austrian <strong>of</strong>ficials sent to the scene. As well, thirdly, to prevent any abuses<br />
toward the population. <strong>The</strong>y were to remedy any possible grievances in<br />
collaboration with the representatives <strong>of</strong> both <strong>Hungary</strong> and Austria. At the time<br />
<strong>of</strong> the handover, set for August 26-28, the Entente <strong>of</strong>ficers were expected to<br />
send reports every six hours to the generals <strong>of</strong> the Military Mission in Sopron.<br />
<strong>The</strong> gendarmerie, working alongside the local authorities, was asked to provide<br />
courier services. <strong>The</strong> Entente <strong>of</strong>ficers were empowered to requisition local cars<br />
and other means <strong>of</strong> transportation, typewriters, etc., over and above any<br />
resources provided to them. <strong>The</strong>y were also to have free use <strong>of</strong> the railways,<br />
mail and telegraph services, and <strong>of</strong>ficial and private telephones, day or night on<br />
a priority basis. 261<br />
<strong>The</strong> Hungarian-Austrian negotiations continued in August. <strong>The</strong> first<br />
discussion at the highest level took place in Vienna on the 3 rd , attended by,<br />
among others, former Foreign Minister Gustav Gratz and Chancellor Schober.<br />
Here, they came to an agreement that about one-third <strong>of</strong> <strong>Western</strong> <strong>Hungary</strong> will<br />
remain as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>Hungary</strong>. <strong>The</strong> affected parts were: the part <strong>of</strong> Moson County<br />
stretching to Lake Fertő, Sopron County to Vulka Creek, the city <strong>of</strong> Sopron, as<br />
well as a strip <strong>of</strong> Vas County. <strong>The</strong> agreement was strongly supported by prelate<br />
Ignaz Seipel, the most influential member <strong>of</strong> the Christian-Socialist Party and<br />
later chancellor. Schober also stressed that this territorial agreement would have<br />
to be ratified by the Foreign Affairs committee <strong>of</strong> the Austrian parliament. 262<br />
<strong>The</strong> committee, however, did not ratify the agreement at either its 13 th or 27 th<br />
meetings. In fact, it declared that any possible territorial concession will be<br />
contingent on the prior handing over <strong>of</strong> Burgenland. <strong>The</strong> committee was only<br />
willing to consider renouncing its claim to the almost entirely Hungarianpopulated<br />
village <strong>of</strong> Nagycenk because the body <strong>of</strong> the “greatest Hungarian,”<br />
Count István Széchenyi, was resting there in the family crypt. This, in spite <strong>of</strong><br />
Foreign Minister Miklós Bánffy coming to terms with the handing over <strong>of</strong> the<br />
territory if Sopron and its surrounding area remain in Hungarian hands until the<br />
conclusion <strong>of</strong> the negotiations. 263<br />
In the meantime, the Hungarian government submitted another territorial<br />
proposition in which it laid claim to Sopron, a portion <strong>of</strong> the Lake Fertő area<br />
and about a 5 km. wide strip <strong>of</strong> Vas County. It, however, made no <strong>of</strong>fer <strong>of</strong> any<br />
261 Mollay, Károly: A Szövetségközi Katonai Bizottság bizalmas utasítása a hozzá<br />
beosztott antanttisztekhez. <strong>1921</strong>. augusztus 1 [Confidential instructions to the <strong>of</strong>ficers<br />
delegated to the Inter-Allied Military Mission. Aug. 21, <strong>1921</strong>]. In: Soproni Szemle,<br />
1991, issue 4, pp. 316–317; unabridged French-language instructions, pp. 317–319.<br />
262 Fogarassy, 1971, op. cit., p. 302.<br />
263 Fogarassy, 1982, op. cit., p. 16.<br />
108